

# Civil-Military Cooperation

*Norwegian CIMIC in Afghanistan*

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## Preface

Working with this thesis has been a long, but at the same time a most instructive and interesting process. The theme of the thesis has been, and certainly still is subject to profound developments, which has made my work even more exciting but also demanding. Several people deserve to be mentioned for their great help in the process of writing this thesis. First of all Per Kristensen and Tone Danielsen from the CIMIC section at the Norwegian Defence Staff College. They have provided me with literature and contacts, and have been my CIMIC mentors. My supervisor Janne Haaland Matlary has provided me with constructive comments and good guidance, for which I am grateful. I would also like to thank my class at the Norwegian War Academy, for inviting me into a world previously quite unknown to me. I am grateful to the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) for kindly giving me access to their KFOR V database. Thank you Todd Wilson for proof-reading my English, and to all my friends and family: thank you for being patient and supporting me at all times. Last, but certainly not least, I am very grateful to my informants for having devoted their time to me and shared their insights. Some of them have been exceedingly helpful with providing literature, proof-reading and general encouragement. Their contributions form the basis of this thesis. The picture on the front-page is used with permission.

The published result is, of course, my responsibility.

Blindern, 27 October 2005

Lene Kristoffersen

## List of abbreviations

ACTED	Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (Agence d'aide à la coopération technique et au développement)
CA	Civil Affairs
CCC	CIMIC Coordination Centre
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CGN	CIMIC Group North
CHODN	Chief of Defence Norway
CIMIC	Civil Military Cooperation
CJ9	Combined Joint 9
CMCoord	Civil-Military Coordination
CMO	Civil-Military Operations
CRO	Crisis Response Operations
DDR	Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration
DPKO	(UN) Department of Peacekeeping Operations
EU	European Union
FOHK	Norwegian Joint Headquarter
HQ CGN	CIMIC Group North Headquarter
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFOR	Implementation Force
IO	International Organization
IR	International Relations
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
KMB	Kabul Multinational Brigade
KFOR	Kosovo Force
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MNB	Multi National Brigade
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
NODSC	Norwegian Defence Staff College
NOK	Norwegian Kroner
NORCAPS	Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support
NUPI	Norwegian Foreign Policy institute
OCHA	(UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Teams
PSO	Peace Support Operation
SCA	Swedish Committee for Afghanistan
SFOR	Stabilisation Force
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SSO	Senior Staff Officer
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNSC	UN Security Council

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## **Part 1: Introduction**

### **1. Introduction**

*“Whatever we call these operations, peace enforcement or peacekeeping, they will require a civilian component and a civilian-military interface. That’s been the case in all of these operations in the past and most certainly in Bosnia, and it will be one of the key lessons learned for the future”*

Carl Bildt, The High Representative, Bosnia-Herzegovina (May 1996).

#### **1.1 Theme**

“Peacekeeping is no longer what it used to be”, states Espen Barth Eide (2001:1), and continues to point out that peacekeeping has become “...a more complex, comprehensive and dangerous activity.” Just as peacekeeping is transforming both in terms of execution and conceptually, so is civil-military cooperation. The development of traditional peacekeeping into multidimensional third-generation peacekeeping has caused a blurring of the traditional division of roles and labour between the military and civilian components. The NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia launched in December 1995 was the Alliance’s first military engagement on land and contributed greatly, according to Barth Eide (2001:3), to reshaping its identity. In the early phases of IFOR the focus was to avoid undertaking what was perceived to be civilian tasks. Increasingly however, the understanding of a military mandate expanded, and this realization helped forge closer ties between the peacekeeping force and its civilian counterparts (ibid). The following operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq have further strengthened these ties, but also exposed areas of contention between the military and civilian components. Yet the realization seems to be that no component can succeed

in isolation. Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) is a military tool developed by NATO to facilitate coordination and cooperation between the NATO commander and the civilian agencies and players in the operational theatre.

## ***1.2 Background for the research question***

The new security-political landscape which arose subsequent to the end of the Cold War has brought with it paradigmatic changes to peacekeeping and civil-military cooperation. Conceptual development and confusion have been intertwined with divergent approaches to the mission by contributing nations in multinational military operations. In this section I will elaborate more on this to set the stage for my research question.

### **1.2.1 The generations of peacekeeping**

The history of peacekeeping may be presented as different generations of peacekeeping. The first generation of peacekeeping occurred after the end of the Second World War. First generation peacekeeping may also be labelled traditional peacekeeping, defined as:

“A traditional peacekeeping operation is composed of lightly armed military personnel deployed in a conflict area under a mandate of the UN Security Council, and with the consent of the parties to the conflict. The peacekeeping force is to be impartial to the conflicting parties and base its activities on the principle of minimum use of force (self-protection)” (in Nissen, 2002:7).

First generation peacekeeping was involved in interstate conflicts, where the parties gave their consent to the deployment. The UN forces were perceived as impartial and could only use military force in self-defence.

Second generation peacekeeping occurred after the fall of the “Iron Curtain”. Now peacekeeping efforts were required in intrastate conflicts, altering the premises for the deployments. Second generation peacekeeping has also been labelled Peace Support Operations (PSO). NATO applies the following definition of PSOs:

“PSOs are multi-functional operations, conducted impartially, normally in support of an internationally recognised organisation such as the UN or Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), involving military forces and diplomatic and humanitarian agencies. PSOs are designed to achieve a longer term political settlement or other specified conditions. They include Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement as well as conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace building and humanitarian relief” (AJP-3.4.1 Chapter 2, article 0202).

According to the preface of the NATO doctrine on PSOs, AJP-3.4.1 (2001), there are two types of NATO military operations, Article 5<sup>1</sup> Collective Defence Operations and non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (CRO). The preface further states that PSOs are continually developing within the context of CRO. CROs are given a high profile in the Strategic Concept developed by NATO in 1999 (Frantzen 2005:70). CROs are a more comprehensive framework for military operations. In this thesis I will employ the term Peace Support Operation (PSO). The definition provides a hint as to the selection of concepts developed to describe international military operations. Second generation peacekeeping operations were more complex than first generation peacekeeping, and adjusted to the new security landscape as it took form after 1989. The peacekeeping operations of the 1990s were multidisciplinary, with a great number of different players present in the theatre. Reaching consensus was often impeded by anarchy and the lack of state structures. The military became more heavily equipped, and its mandate extended. Examples of second generation peacekeeping operations are the UN Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR), and the UN operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) (Dybwad 1999:7).

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<sup>1</sup> This article states that an armed attack against one or more of the Allies in Europe or North America shall be considered as an attack against all

The peacekeeping operations of today have evolved into a third generation of peacekeeping. According to Dybwad (1999:7), third generation peacekeeping is characterized by long-term peace- and nation building efforts, and an expanded regional responsibility. Civil-military cooperation has entered the scene as a crucial tool in dealing with the great number of players. The new peacekeeping has a substantial non-military mandate and composition in addition to its military component. The objective is to consolidate state structures by means of a repertoire of tasks conducted by a wide range of players. Examples of third generation peacekeeping operations are the Implementation Force (IFOR) and the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in the former Yugoslavia.

### **1.2.2 Different national approaches to Peace Support Operations**

The myriad of concepts attempting to capture the activities, purposes and nature of PSOs are confronted with a multinational reality in which the mission is interpreted and solved differently by various national militaries. Nissen (2002:72) observes that although all nations in KFOR operated under the same mandate and regulations, a wide variety of interpretations were apparent in practice. Seemingly each nation ultimately prioritised national standards. The statement “Germans and Americans are dressed like knights from the Middle Ages”<sup>2</sup> made by a Norwegian officer illustrates how the differences may be perceived.

Based on two recent articles in The New York Times I will briefly show how national militaries act differently in Iraq. Under the heading “Legacy of Empire Guides British Troops in Iraq”, John F. Burns (2004) claims that divergent perspectives have resulted in different fighting strategies:

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<sup>2</sup> NUPI database on KFOR V

“At Falluja, Najaf, Samarra and Tal Afar, and in Sadr City before the truce, the Americans hit hard, seeking to kill as many rebels as possible. The British, throughout the war, have favoured “less robust” fighting to contain the rebels with defensive actions, not to eliminate them.”

Employment of lethal force was not to be the focus of the British approach to fighting. Burns quotes a British brigadier who claims that the British have learned the importance of adjusting to local cultures, and not to impose alien solutions, from its legacy as an empire. Burns concludes his article by illuminating parts of the “winning hearts and minds”<sup>3</sup> mentality of the British army:

“British soldiers are encouraged to engage amicably with ordinary Iraqis. As often as possible, they wear berets instead of helmets, travel in aging, soft-sided Land Rovers instead of armoured vehicles, and mount foot patrols with lowered weapons.”

The Dutch approach is conveyed by the N.Y. Times journalist Norimitsu Onishi (2004), under the heading “Dutch Forces’ Objective: Rebuilding Iraq With Trust”. Onishi suggests that the Dutch have absorbed the national shame felt after the Srebrenica massacre in 1995, and have developed “the Dutch approach to patrolling.” The soldiers in effect act as part neighbourhood police officers and part as social workers. They assert that security increases by making soldiers accessible and vulnerable to their surroundings. Inaccessibility, on the other hand, decreases security. Support and consent are perceived as forms of protection. With the words of Onishi, parts of the “winning hearts and minds” strategy of the Dutch is as follows: “Instead of armoured vehicles, the Dutch drive vehicles that leave them exposed to the people around them. To encourage interaction with local residents, they go bareheaded and are forbidden to wear mirror sunglasses.” The Dutch contend that their soft approach will keep them safer than if they had pursued a harder approach like the Americans who, due to their anxiety for car-bombers, drive in armoured vehicles pointing guns at drivers to keep other cars at a distance.

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<sup>3</sup> Tacitly or actively winning the support and trust of the general population (The reader is referred to Mockaitis 2003:21).

### **1.2.3 A brief introduction to civil-military cooperation, CIMIC**

The concepts of peacekeeping and civil-military cooperation have been undergoing a paradigm shift as a result of the new security landscape emerging after the end of the Cold War. Military commanders are now required to take into account factors of social, political, cultural, religious, economic, environmental, and humanitarian nature, the presence of international organizations (IOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the presence of the media and the expectations of both the international and local communities when planning and conducting military operations (Bi-SC 86-3 article 2). Rollins (2001:123) lists some new and pressing questions for military commanders, such as where does the military mission end and where does that of the civilian partners begin? How is the NATO Commander to deal with the fact that there is such a wide range of civilian players? How does he reconcile the military organizational structures with looser civilian ones? The paradigmatic shift has had an impact both on national doctrines and on the doctrines of international organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the United Nations (UN). The operations in the Balkans acted as a catalyst for CIMIC. NATO defines CIMIC as:

“The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies” (MC 411/1).

Rich (2002) claims that most western states and NATO members in particular, broadly follow the NATO approach with variations in emphasis. Norwegian CIMIC is based on the NATO doctrine, as expressed by one CIMIC-officer “Norwegian CIMIC is NATO CIMIC, or NATO CIMIC is Norwegian CIMIC, that is our attitude.”<sup>4</sup> As chapter four of

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<sup>4</sup> Interview 6 April, 2005

this thesis is dedicated to a thorough account of CIMIC, I will let these brief remarks suffice for now, and move on to illustrate the “variations in emphasis.”

#### **1.2.4 National approaches to civil-military cooperation**

In spite of increased doctrinal work both internationally and nationally, the concept of civil-military cooperation is still perceived as unclear and triggers a variety of associations by the different players (Jensen 2003:3).<sup>5</sup> Rich (2002) stresses that no international consensus yet exists on what the concept of CIMIC should contain exactly. A Ministry of Defence (MoD) official whom I have interviewed points to the lack of a unified CIMIC-policy, and indicates that divergent approaches to the NATO doctrine constitute a problem.<sup>6</sup>

The article “Civil-military cooperation in peace operations: the case of Kosovo” written by Mockaitis (2004) illustrates the different approaches to CIMIC which might occur in a PSO. He investigates how CIMIC was performed in the five multinational brigade (MNB) areas Kosovo was divided into, and I will briefly present the CIMIC approaches in four of the MNBs. In MNB West, run by the Italians, the most relevant point mentioned by Mockaitis (ibid:21) was the fact that the Italians understood the local culture and enjoyed good relations with the Kosovar Albanians.

The Multinational Brigade Area North was run by the French. MNB North had what Mockaitis (ibid:11) labels a “flexible approach to CIMIC,” allowing for force protection rules where individual units could determine security measures appropriate to each task and situation. The CIMIC units had good relations with NGOs, but a limited humanitarian budget. The resources of MNB North were available for CIMIC projects throughout the

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<sup>5</sup> This source is quoted with permission from the author

<sup>6</sup> Interview 20 May, 2005

area of operations. The French units deployed for four months, among the shortest tours in KFOR causing grievances with their NGO counterparts.

The Americans run the Multinational Brigade Area East. Extensive traditional force protection measures<sup>7</sup> were an obstacle to CIMIC, or Civilian Affairs (CA) activities, which is the American label. The U.S. army did not allow individual units to determine security measures to fit particular tasks. Mockaitis (ibid:15) quotes the observation of one officer that “being dressed like a Ninja Turtle gets in the way,” impeding i.e. relationship building which is essential to CIMIC. Lia and Hansen (1998:39) state that based on the experiences in Bosnia and in the U.S. led humanitarian intervention in Somalia, the American forces seek a great degree of isolation, emphasising physical force protection. CIMIC activities were the preserve of dedicated CA units, and removed from the rest of the force. CIMIC was not perceived as vital to security. The CA teams had almost no material resources with which to conduct projects, but could lend their skills and expertise to civilian counterparts. The American units deployed for six months.

Multinational Brigade Area South was run by the Germans, and here the CIMIC activities were conducted in a manner similar to the Americans, with what Mockaitis labels a “conservative approach” (2004:18). Excessive traditional force protection was combined with projects initiated to fulfil a national agenda. Mockaitis (ibid:20) points to the Austrians operating in MNB South, which had a very different and according to him more effective approach. Lacking a humanitarian budget, the Austrians located NGOs willing to fund projects and lend their military resources to it. The Austrians were innovative in charging an individual in the Austrian MoD with providing donors for CIMIC projects in Kosovo. The Austrian attitude to physical force protection was relaxed, adjusting armament and protective measures to the situation at hand.

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<sup>7</sup> Traditional force protection measures refer to physical measures to secure the force. The concept of force protection may be perceived as much broader, containing factors such as “situational awareness” and obtaining “good-will” with the local population



The British run Multinational Brigade Area Centre. Their expertise and experience with civil conflict and consequent “winning hearts and minds” philosophy were admired attributes. The brigade Commander proclaimed that “CIMIC is every soldier’s job” (ibid:24), and this is in line with the British doctrine which prescribes that many CIMIC tasks are to be conducted by conventional British troops rather than being the preserve of dedicated forces (Rich 2002). The British had a broader understanding of security, perceiving that good relations with the local community was just as important to force protection as flak jackets and barbed wire. Traditional force protection was perceived to potentially create a barrier between the peacekeepers and the local population (Mockaitis 2004:25).

Landon and Hayes (2001) explain the different national approaches to CIMIC by depicting a process where an initial “unity of effort” attitude based on the mandate are being processed through the national perspectives of the different contingencies, and this mission interpretation results in divergent executions of the mandate. This result in a spectrum, where they place the U.S. at one far end with their strict focus on force protection, the U.K. approach somewhere in the middle, and the Nordic and NATO approaches closer to the other end (ibid).

### **1.3 Research question**

On the basis of section 1.2 I find it interesting to put forward the following research question:

*"What explains the Norwegian decision to contribute with a civil-military cooperation unit to the peace support operation in Afghanistan, and consequently what explains the Norwegian approach to civil-military cooperation in Afghanistan?"*

The Norwegian CIMIC unit was offered to NATO in the fall of 2002.<sup>8</sup> The unit consists of three CIMIC elements. The first element deployed in February 2003, and the mission was terminated in February 2004 upon the return of the third element. The research question has two parts, which will be analyzed in two separate chapters but subjected to the same theoretical frame. I have chosen to set up a competitive theoretical design, where a rationalist explanation model will be tested against a culturalist explanation model. The aim is to find out which model carries the most explanatory power in terms of explaining the research question. When analyzing the first part of the research question I will investigate to what degree certain rational and cultural variables have an impact on the decision to contribute with a CIMIC unit to Afghanistan. My main focus will lie with the second part of the research question, where I will analyze how rational and cultural variables influence the approach of the Norwegian CIMIC unit to CIMIC in Afghanistan.

#### **1.4 Delimitations<sup>9</sup>**

The topic of this thesis is extensive, and consequently certain delimitations are required. Geographically the thesis will be limited to the PSO in Afghanistan. I have not done any field-observations in Afghanistan, which would have provided me with a more comprehensive picture, including the versions of relevant civilian parties. Comparing CIMIC approaches in different PSOs could be interesting, but due to a limited amount of space this is not attainable. Further on, as stated by the Director of the Strategic Studies Institute, Douglas C. Lovelace Jr., “examining diverse national approaches to CIMIC in the field reveals the best practices and common mistakes. Properly analyzed and learned, these lessons can inform the conduct of current and future operations” (in Mockaitis 2004:iii). Due to accessible sources and the scope of the thesis a comparative study was unattainable. Still, the existence of different national approaches to CIMIC underlies this

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<sup>8</sup> E-mail correspondence with MoD official 20 July, 2005

<sup>9</sup> As a matter of simplicity I choose to write CIMIC instead of NATO CIMIC, and rather state explicitly when I am not writing about NATO CIMIC.

thesis, and by investigating how different variables have an impact on the Norwegian approach to CIMIC, I will offer some general remarks on the phenomenon of divergent approaches in the concluding sections.

Due to limited space I will not elaborate on the transformation of the Norwegian armed forces which incrementally has taken place since the end of the Cold War. Further on I will focus on the army exclusively when elaborating on the military organizational culture, without any reference to the navy or the air force. Ulriksen (2002:23) states that national militaries and the different branches within the militaries vary strongly in their inner organization, culture and identity. The different perceptions within the branches influence the choice of tactics, doctrine, strategy and material. This thesis will not elaborate on this point, but focus on the army as CIMIC is an army discipline.

CIMIC must not be confused with civil-military cooperation in a Norwegian “total-defence” context. In White Paper 45 (2000-2001, article 4.3) the pillars of the Norwegian “defence concept” are presented. The defence concept provides the main directions for the Norwegian defence policy. The pillars are 1) a modern and flexible defence; 2) allied and international defence-cooperation; 3) conscription; and 4) civil-military cooperation. The “total defence” is based on the principle of being able to mobilize the collective resources of the nation if Norway or the Alliance should be attacked (ibid:4.3.4). Recently the concept of “total defence” has been integrated into a wider perspective with the label “civil-military cooperation” (ibid:2.3), incorporating the need for a comprehensive utilization of civilian and military resources to maintain Norwegian security and interests (ibid:4.3.4). Despite basic common features, CIMIC in PSOs and civil-military cooperation in a “total defence” context are distinct concepts not to be confused with each other<sup>10</sup>.

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<sup>10</sup> The reader is referred to read more on civil-military cooperation and the related “total defence” concept in White Paper 45 (2000-2001)

## **1.5 Structure of the thesis**

In the introductory part I presented some new trends and conceptual developments in the field of peacekeeping and civil-military cooperation, and showed how different national militaries approach international military missions differently. Based on this I formulated a research question. The second part of this thesis will present the theoretical and methodological frameworks. In the theoretical chapter I will deduce four hypotheses, two for each part of the research question. The hypotheses will be deduced from two theories. These theories are the rational policy model developed by Graham Allison and a culturalist theory developed by Elizabeth Kier. The methodological chapter will describe how I operationalize my four hypotheses, discuss the reliability and validity of the hypotheses, and present the sources I rely on. The third part is an empirical background chapter, which goes into depth on civil-military cooperation and also briefly presents my case, which is Norwegian civil-military cooperation in Afghanistan. The analysis is the fourth part of the thesis. This part is comprised by two chapters, one for each part of the research question. Finally, in part seven, both empirical and theoretical findings are presented and discussed. On the basis of such findings certain conclusions are drawn.

## **Part 2: Theoretical and methodological approaches**

### **2. Theoretical approach**

#### ***2.1 Introduction***

The purpose of this chapter is to develop a theoretical framework suited to investigate the research question. The theoretical framework will be employed as an analytical tool based on two explanatory models, or substantive theories,<sup>11</sup> derived from rationalism and culturalism respectively. Based on the assumptions of rationalism I will apply the first model developed by Graham Allison, the rational policy model. The culturalist approach will be based on the works of Elizabeth Kier. First I will describe these two substantive theories and explain why they are suited to form the theoretical framework for my research question. Next I will develop one rationalist and one culturalist hypothesis which may explain the first part of the research question, and consequently the same procedure for the second part of the research question. I have chosen to set up a competitive design, and will make some remarks on this choice in section 2.5. I will conclude the theoretical chapter with presenting certain challenges to the theoretical framework.

#### ***2.2 How to investigate the research question***

The research question presented in the introductory chapter makes for the following inquiry:

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<sup>11</sup> Jupille (et al. 2002:5) define substantive theories as "...a system of conditional statements about the relationships among specific variables."

*"What explains the Norwegian decision to contribute with a civil-military cooperation unit to the peace support operation in Afghanistan, and consequently what explains the Norwegian approach to civil-military cooperation in Afghanistan?"*

Landon and Hayes (2001:2) state that the variety of national approaches to CIMIC "... is due in part to different nations being involved in different types of military commitments in the past 50 years, and in part to their different perspectives of their own national interests." In this quote they suggest that a combination of previous military experiences and national interests have an impact on the development of a certain approach to CIMIC. National interests are a rationalist variable, whilst historic military commitments perhaps hint to more culturalist variables such as learning, identity and culture. In light of this I find it interesting to develop a theoretical framework based on rationalism and culturalism.

Rationalism is a meta-theoretical approach in the study of International Relations (IR), and therefore can not serve as a substantive theory in itself (Christiansen et al. 2003:3). The label "culturalism" is used by Desch (1998:141) amongst others, and is not to be confused with the meta-theoretical approach of constructivism but rather considered as a research program<sup>12</sup> focusing on cultural factors when attempting to explain empirical phenomena. One may claim that culturalism belongs to the family of moderate or conventional constructivist theories. According to Jupille et al. (2002:9) "... moderate constructivists often explore the role of social facts – norms or culture - in constructing the interests and identities of states/agents." As Jupille et al. (ibid) point out, constructivism harbours a range of currents of thinking, and this is equally true for rationalism.

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<sup>12</sup> Desch (1998:155) defines "research program" as clusters of theories that share the same core assumptions, but might have different auxiliary assumptions, which could lead them to make different predictions about the same case

### **2.2.1 Rationalism and the Rational Policy Model**

The traditionally dominant meta-theoretical approach in the field of IR has been rationalism, and the traditionally dominant rationalist theory has been realism. Arguably there is not one, but several currents of realist thought sharing a set of key assumptions. Kenneth Waltz is the founding father of the realist current of thinking known as “neo-realism.”<sup>13</sup> In neo-realism the prime interests of states are fixed and maximized. Security in terms of survival and protection from threats are on top of the hierarchy of interests. The international system is perceived as anarchic and conflictual. In neo-realism the structure of the international system conditions the behaviour of states, and the central instrument for maintaining security is military capacity. Hence a strong military power is a central aim.

Neo-realism postulates that similar threats lead to similar responses, in other words, neo-realism suggests that faced with the same threat-picture, nations will choose the same military response. Diverging responses indicate that the threat-picture is perceived differently. Neo-realism expects similar doctrines to emerge in comparable states. This gives rise to a weakness with neo-realism in the new security-political landscape. Neo-realism seems to be bound up to an old mental map stemming from the Cold War, where the landscape of security policy was very different from today and tied up to a bipolar imagery. Transformations of militaries and perceptions have gradually taken place in most Western countries, to adjust to the new circumstances. One might suggest that some countries have been and still are clinging to a “constructed threat-picture”, whilst other countries more readily have adjusted to a more “realistic threat-picture” mirroring the new realities. One country seemingly clinging to an old, territorial perception of threats against national security is Finland, as expressed in the Finnish defence report published in 2004. According to the Norwegian Defence Attaché in Finland, Colonel Ivar Lars Viddal, the

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<sup>13</sup> His well-known book “Theory of International Politics”, published in 1979, established the basis for the neo-realist school

defence of the Finnish territory is still on top of the agenda in Finland, in addition to active international participation (Svela 2005).

To analyze the decision to contribute with a CIMIC unit and the consequent Norwegian approach to CIMIC in Afghanistan I choose not to employ neo-realism. As we have already seen, there are a variety of approaches to CIMIC, arguably also amongst comparable states. Instead I will use the rational policy model developed by Graham Allison, which allows me to look more into national security-political objectives and the military and political means required to reach such objectives. The rational policy model is also advantageous due to its simplicity and capacity to easily deduce hypotheses.

In his well-known article from 1969, Graham T. Allison claims that most analysts explain the behaviour of national governments in terms of one basic conceptual model, which he entitles the Rational Policy Model (Allison 1969:690). Allison stipulates that the agent is usually a nation or a government, conceived as a rational, unitary decision maker. When faced with a strategic problem, the agent is provided with a “spectrum of options” constituting the various relevant courses of action (ibid:694). Each alternative course of action produces consequences, providing the agent with a “spectrum of consequences.” Attached to each consequence are benefits and costs related to strategic goals and objectives. The agent is now presented with a choice. The rational agent pursues a rational choice, selecting the course of action whose consequences maximizes its goals and objectives (ibid). The principle aims of the agent are national interests and national security. Allison further claims that the nation is moved to act by threats and opportunities arising in the “international strategic market place” (ibid). Resources are deployed strategically, in order to further national interests. Cultural factors may be deployed to this end (Katzenstein in Katzenstein (ed.) 1996: 17). Theories based on the rationalist



framework generally direct attention away from cultural variables, treating them as mere epiphenomena.<sup>14</sup>

The “essentially contested concept”<sup>15</sup> of security needs some further elaboration before proceeding. As the international security landscape has changed following the end of the Cold War, so has the security concept. The theoretical literature suggests different definitions of national security. The narrow, traditional definition of security wants to retain a military focus, whilst the “wideners” want to extend the range of issues on the security agenda (Buzan 1997:5). Despite the relevance of an extended security concept, this thesis adopts a traditional, narrow definition of security. This is in accordance with the rationalist framework and the rational policy model. When it comes to the alternative culturalist explanatory model it might, as Katzenstein suggests (in Katzenstein (ed.) 1996:11), have been easier to broaden the concept of security and investigate a “new” security issue. But then, as Katzenstein argues, the rationalist framework would not have been met on its “preferred ground” (ibid). Civil-military cooperation in PSOs belongs to the military domain and is a “hard case”, despite the fact that CIMIC as a tool is part of the stabilization efforts and does not belong to the sharper end of the spectre of military contributions.

### **2.2.2 Culturalism and Elizabeth Kier**

The unexpected end of the Cold War sparked a renewed interest in the search for cultural explanations for state behaviour in the international system. According to Desch (1998:141) we are now at the high watermark of a third wave<sup>16</sup> of culturalism in the field of international security studies. This wave, claims Desch, comprises a heterogeneous lot

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<sup>14</sup> Epiphenomenon: a secondary phenomenon associated with and apparently due to a primary phenomenon

<sup>15</sup> Label made by W. B. Gallie to describe core concepts in the social sciences such as power, justice, peace, equality and freedom, all of which are difficult concepts which have inspired large literatures (quoted in Buzan 1991:7)

<sup>16</sup> Desch (1998) identifies the World War II wave, the Cold War wave and the post-cold War wave of cultural theorizing in the field of international security studies

united in the belief that realism is an overrated body of theory, and that cultural theories, which look to ideational factors, are more valid in explaining how the world works. Katzenstein claims that "... the Cold War made relatively unproblematic some of the cultural factors affecting national security. Theories that abstracted from these factors offered important insights..." but, with the end of the Cold War "Issues dealing with norms, identities and culture are becoming more salient" (in Katzenstein (ed.) 1996: 2).

In "The culture of National Security: Norms and Security in World Politics", edited by Katzenstein, a number of empirical and theoretical essays question the rationalist premise of treating national interests as fixed. Katzenstein states the following:

"State interests do not exist to be "discovered" by self-interested, rational actors. Interests are constructed through a process of social interaction. "Defining", not "defending", the national interest is what this book seeks to understand" (in Katzenstein (ed.) 1996:2).

The argument put forward is that security interests are defined by actors who respond to cultural factors, emanating from either its domestic or its international environments, or possibly from both. Elizabeth Kier has written one of the empirical essays in the Katzenstein volume. She has also extended her argument in "Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars" published in 1997. I will apply Kiers' framework for analyzing the choice of military doctrine to my study of civil-military cooperation. One argument for using her analytical model is that, despite some weaknesses which I will elaborate on later, her framework offers a comprehensive model for investigating the impact of culture.

Elizabeth Kier (1997) argues that doctrinal developments are best understood from a cultural perspective, focusing on cultural factors in domestic environments. She argues that different domestic political cultures will adopt divergent military doctrines based on concerns about the domestic balance of power, not on external strategic factors. She

claims that the French domestic political and military organizational cultures before World War II prevented the French from developing a doctrine better suited to avoid the defeat of May 1940. The French civilian leadership were more concerned with the domestic threat from the French military than with the threat from Germany. Furthermore, she argues that a cultural approach applies to military organizations as well as to civilian policymakers. She claims that not all military organizations have the same culture, and that these differences often account for their doctrinal preferences (Kier 1997:21). Military organizations have different world views and divergent perceptions about the proper conduct of a mission (Kier in Katzenstein (ed.) 1996:187). In her own words “...the interaction between the constraints set in the domestic political arena and the military’s organizational culture shapes the choice between offensive and defensive military doctrines” (Kier 1997:21).

To determine “political culture” Kier focus on civilian policymakers’ beliefs about the role of the armed forces in the domestic arena. She (ibid:26) launches a number of questions to help determine political culture, of which I will focus on one, asking “What is the perception of the role of the military in society?”<sup>17</sup> Kier (ibid) suggests that a state’s experiences with the military in the state-building process often provide the answer to this question.

Kier defines organizational culture as “...the set of basic assumptions, values, norms, beliefs and formal knowledge that shape collective understandings” (ibid:28). She claims that research on organizational culture is “particularly well suited to studying the military” (ibid). The main reason for this it that the military organization may be perceived as a “total institution” (ibid:29), characterized by long-term membership, powerful assimilation mechanisms, and the definition of its member’s status, identity, and interactions by the organization.

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<sup>17</sup> The other questions are not considered relevant to my case

Kier refuses the basic rationalist assumption that preferences are given and interests self-evident, and aims at showing how actors' cultures help define their interests. Further on she claims that a state's position in the international system is indeterminate of choices between offensive and defensive doctrines. Consequently Kier abolishes two vital assumptions from the rational policy model. She challenges the assumption of exogenously given interests, and the assumption that nations are moved to act by threats and opportunities arising in the "international strategic market place." Stressing the "indeterminacy of the international system" Kier suggests that the international system does not guide actions (1997:12).<sup>18</sup>

### ***2.3 What explains the Norwegian decision to contribute with a civil-military cooperation unit to Afghanistan?***

To analyze the decision to contribute with a CIMIC unit to Afghanistan I will infer two hypotheses, based on the rational policy model and Kier respectively.

#### **2.3.1 National security-policy interests and military-strategic objectives**

The dependent variable in this part of the research question is a dichotomy, varying between the decision to contribute with a CIMIC unit<sup>19</sup> and the decision not to. According to the rational policy model we expect that an agent acts based on rational calculations of the alternative courses of action, aiming to maximize strategic goals. To the political authorities, the strategic goal will be to maximize national security-policy interests. To the military agent the strategic goal will be to achieve military-strategic objectives in

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<sup>18</sup> According to Desch (1998:169) "When a state faces either external or internal threats, structure is determinative; when it faces both, or neither, structure is indeterminate. In such an indeterminant threat environment, it is necessary to look to other variables to explain various types of strategic behaviour. Culture and other domestic variables may take on greater independent explanatory power in these cases." Consequently Desch would prescribe the structure as determinative in the French case as presented by Kier, where she ignores the international environment but points to internal threats due to a strong military.

<sup>19</sup> Most, if not all national contingencies have CIMIC or liaison officers integrated in the contingency, here I am talking about specifically organized CIMIC units working in parallel with the contingencies

accordance with the defined national security-policy interests. Based on the postulates forwarded by Allison, the hypothesis claims the following:

*H 1: To contribute with a civil-military cooperation unit to Afghanistan was a rational course of action maximizing Norwegian security-policy interests and military-strategic objectives.*

How I intend to operationalize my hypotheses will be elaborated in the methodological chapter.

### **2.3.2 Political culture and military organizational culture**

As mentioned earlier, Kier aims at showing how the culture of actors define their interests, refuting the rationalist assumption that interest are exogenously given. Whereas the Norwegian security-policy interests were “defended” by means of contributing with a CIMIC unit to Afghanistan in the rationalist hypothesis, the culturalist hypothesis rather claims that:

*H 2: To contribute with a civil-military cooperation unit to Afghanistan was a Norwegian interest defined by Norwegian political and military organizational culture.*

## **2.4 What explains the Norwegian approach to civil-military cooperation in Afghanistan?**

As mentioned before, the main focus of the thesis lies with this part of the research question. The analysis will be based on the same theoretical framework as the first part, and accordingly I will infer two hypotheses, one from each substantive theory.

### **2.4.1 Military rationalism and national security-policy interests**

The dependent variable, approach to CIMIC, is not a dichotomy when analyzing the second part of the research question. To use Mockaitis' labels, the approach to CIMIC may vary along a spectre, ranging from the "conservative approach" on one end through the "flexible approach" and to what might be labelled the "liberal approach" on the other end. The "liberal approach" to CIMIC could be characterized by a minimum of traditional force protection measures and access to humanitarian funds

The rational policy model assumes that the rational agent will act based on rational calculations of the alternative courses of action, aiming to maximize strategic goals. The agent is the Norwegian CIMIC elements. The strategic goal would be to maximize national security-policy interests and to act rationally judged from a military position. To act "militarily rationally" would be to act in accordance with the doctrine, but adjusted to the current situation in the area of operations. Hence the rationalist hypothesis states the following:

*H 3: The Norwegian approach to civil-military cooperation in Afghanistan was a rational military approach maximizing Norwegian security-policy interests.*

### **2.4.2 Culture and social learning**

When transferring Kiers framework to the second part of my research question, I must replace her dependent variable, choice of military doctrine, with approach to CIMIC, the independent variables political culture and military organizational culture being the same. The culturalist hypothesis seeking to explain the decision to contribute with a CIMIC unit to Afghanistan had an internal, domestic focus similar to Kiers. When it comes to the Norwegian approach to CIMIC it may be argued that the internal focus must be

supplemented with an external focus. By doing this I question the causality developed by Kier when it comes to applicability to small states. Her cases are France and Great Britain, great powers which yield support to her causal claims. But when it comes to small states, it might be the case that the military organizational culture is causally influenced by the military cultures of other countries in addition to the political culture. Kier's theoretical framework focuses on the cultural-institutional domestic environment, and ignores the international environment. This may prove to be a weakness in the multinational operational environments militaries are faced with today. When it comes to the Norwegian approach to CIMIC, I will suggest that "social learning" from the international environment, in terms of "a social process through which agent properties and preferences change as a result of interaction" (Checkel 2000:2), also may have an impact. Accordingly the culturalist hypothesis makes the following presumption:

*H 4: The Norwegian approach to civil-military cooperation in Afghanistan was a product of the Norwegian political and military organizational culture and the impact of social learning.*

I assume that "social learning" does not have any significant impact on the decision to contribute with CIMIC to Afghanistan. I would rather suggest that it might have had an impact on the decision to develop the capacity in the first place, but that is another question.

## **2.5 Models of theoretical dialogue**

It is sometimes claimed that IR is driven forward by great debates. Katzenstein et al. (1998) propose in the introduction to the golden anniversary issue of International Organization that the debate between rationalism and constructivism will increasingly be in the centre of attention. The aim of this thesis is not to engage in a meta-theoretical debate. But as I am setting up a theoretical framework based on competitive hypotheses

from rationalism and culturalism, it is in order to comment on the relationship between the meta-theoretical positions on which the framework is based. When assessing rationalism and constructivism from a meta-theoretical stance, their divergent positions when it comes to questions of ontology, epistemology and methodology<sup>20</sup> yields the impression that these approaches are irreconcilable.

Jupille et al. seek to identify “....four distinct modes of theoretical conversation: competitive testing; additive theory based on complementary domains of application; sequencing of theories; and incorporation (subsumption)” (2002: 14). When applying two explanatory models it is important to be clear on the intended relationship between the two models. My analytical framework is based on competitive testing. According to Jupille et al. (ibid:15) “Competitive testing means that we do not evaluate our claims only against “the evidence”, but against other theories as well (and, of course, other theories imply other evidence).” Competitive testing seeks to confirm some theories and refute others (ibid:14). The additive and sequential approaches attempt to “...build a more comprehensive composite in which the whole provides some gains over partial representations, all while preserving the integrity of the contributions of the parts” (ibid). Subsumption is hegemonic, implying that “More powerful theories absorb less powerful ones...and then...reproduce these “weaker” theories as derived special cases” (ibid).

Despite the fact that the meta-theoretical foundations of rationalism and constructivism seemingly are at odds, many authors, such as Checkel (2000), have attempted “bridge-building” efforts. I will return to this in my concluding chapter.

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<sup>20</sup> Any philosophy of science includes ontological claims, that is claims about the nature of existence, epistemological considerations, that is claims about what would constitute valid knowledge, and methodological implications, which is the practice of how we come to know (Wight 2002:41).



## **2.6 Challenges to the theoretical framework**

In this section I will present certain challenges to my theoretical framework.

### **2.6.1 The “fruitfulness” of a unitary, rational actor paradigm**

Rationalist theories have been subject to a lot of criticism. Much of it is based on the fact that rationalism focuses on being a parsimonious framework, at the expense of obtaining more complex, empirically relevant theoretical frameworks.

Underdal (1984) has developed a series of criteria to judge the “fruitfulness” of a theoretical model. He uses the criteria generality, conclusiveness, validity and parsimony to assess the fruitfulness of the unitary, rational actor paradigm (ibid:73), which is a vital rationalist assumption and basic to the rational policy model. Underdal claims that the unitary rational actor paradigm is potentially very general, despite the fact that some authors limit its applicability to certain interests, situations and countries. When it comes to conclusiveness the capacity to generate propositions may be prevented when applied to decisions made with uncertainty. Parsimony, or research economy, is a great advantage to the model. Underdal stresses that the main target of criticism has been related to validity (1984:73). Underdal concludes that “...it is so abundantly clear that the fruitfulness of the unitary, rational actor model – as well as of its alternatives – very much depends on the analytical purposes and the empirical instances to which they are applied” (ibid:78). The unitary rational actor paradigm, and consequently the rational policy model, seems “fruitful” in my case, due to the fact that the interests being studied are national-security interests, the Norwegian government traditionally share a common platform in foreign- and security policy, and decisions are made with a reasonable degree of certainty.

A problem for rationalist theory is the prospect of an “embarrassment of interests”, analogous to the “embarrassment of norms,” which will be dealt with later, in which any

behaviour can be explained by reference to some interests. A culturalist would object to rationalism claiming that the rationalist conceptual lenses overlook culture, norms and identity as important causal factors.

### **2.6.2 Culturalism still at sea?**

Lapid, citing Jepperson and Swindler, states that “Culture’s ship has finally come in, and the time is ripe for an inventory of its cargo” (1996:3). The new cultural wave has been subject to much criticism from within the ranks of IR-theorizing.

Desch (1998:150) identifies three potential challenges to assessing the explanatory power of culturalist theories in security studies. The first is that cultural variables are tricky to define and operationalize. Definitions commonly used by cultural theorists are often broad and imprecise, making them hard to operationalize. Kiers defines culture as “the set of basic assumptions, values, norms, beliefs and formal knowledge that shape collective understandings” (1997:28), and her definition may be subject to such criticism. Ambiguous definitions of culture may complicate the formulation of testable theories using these variables (Desch 1998:151). The second challenge suggested by Desch is that some cultural theorists believe that cultural variables make every case *sui generis*. Consequently cultural theories are not broadly applicable and testable across a number of cases. Desch (*ibid*:155) claims that most theories based on domestic culture and organizational culture suffer from this problem, and that it illuminates the questionable compatibility of culture with a positivist approach to social science. The third challenge proposed by Desch is that culturalism is a research program, and hence it does not make sense to assess culturalism as such, researchers must rather test particular culturalist theories. Desch also ascribe realism as a research program, and states that researchers should rather look at particular sets of theories than pitting realism against culturalism. He also claims that both research programs contain theories that might challenge each other (*ibid*:156).

Desch also claims that the post-Cold War wave of cultural theorizing has not selected “hard cases” for testing their cultural theories. Previously I have suggested, along the lines of Katzenstein, that my case is a “hard case” for cultural theorizing. Desch states that:

“The new culturalists believe that they have chosen “hard cases” for their theories just because they focus on national security issues. But what makes a case a “crucial test” and a “hard case” is (1) whether the competing theories make different predictions about its outcome, and (2) whether one theory should be expected to do better at predicting it than another. Issue area, by itself, does not make a case hard or easy” (ibid:166).

Desch makes Kier subject to his critique, claiming that realists would make similar predictions as her, though anticipating that changes in French military doctrine rather reflected Europe’s changing balance of power (ibid:162). Desch concludes by stating that “In short, the new culturalist theories will not supplant realist theories in national security studies because, by themselves, they have very little explanatory power” (ibid:170).

According to Kowert and Legro, “sources” of norms remain ill defined, incompletely theorized, and understudied (in Katzenstein (ed.) 1996: 454). Kowert and Legro (ibid:469) criticize the authors of the essays in the Katzenstein volume for treating their core concepts as exogenously given, explicitly acknowledging that actor identity and behavioural norms are socially constructed, but then proceeding to focus on the impact of these social constructions. Kier seems to neglect the process of norm construction in her analysis of French and British military doctrines. The norms and cultures of the agents appear as exogenously given, as she focuses on the impact of the particular norms and cultures. This study will not elaborate on the “sources” of the cultures anticipated to have an impact on civil-military cooperation. It will be assumed to be beyond the scope of this study, but nonetheless of great importance and the lack of it representing a weakness as

such. Kowert and Legro (ibid:467) also point to the “embarrassment of norms” issue, acknowledging that multiple norms may influence actors and that ultimately any behaviour can be explained with reference to some norm. Finally, agents sometimes manipulate or change norms. This is equivalent to what Kier refers to as “entrepreneurs” manipulating or instrumentally using culture to serve their purposes (1997:32).

### **3. Methodological approach**

#### ***3.1 Introduction***

The purpose of this thesis is to study why Norway decided to contribute with a civil-military cooperation unit to the PSO in Afghanistan, and subsequently the Norwegian approach to CIMIC in Afghanistan. In this chapter I will operationalize my four hypotheses. To operationalize is to demonstrate how the variables are to be measured. I will also assess the reliability and validity of my operationalizations, and present the sources I have used. First I will present the research design of the study, which is the tool chosen for investigating whether the theoretically founded hypotheses get empirical support.

#### ***3.2 The research design: single case study***

The point of departure for this study is a relatively new phenomenon, civil-military cooperation in PSOs. Hence the study will have an investigative and problem-identifying character. The objective is to gain further insight and understanding of the empirical phenomenon. The thesis will to a certain degree have a conceptual focus. According to Frantzen, concepts are important because they provide a common language necessary for our understanding. Further on:

“A new strategic environment, new threats and risks and new norms as well as roles and tasks necessitate new conceptualisation. Defence policy and doctrines provide this conceptualisation... Conceptualisation of security and defence policy provides “mental maps” affecting policymaking and military implementation” (Frantzen 2005:5-6).

My research question provides me with two dependent variables, the first is the decision to contribute with a CIMIC unit, and the second is the Norwegian approach to CIMIC. Further on I operate with a set of independent variables, which is a general feature of case-studies. The case is time-limited. The Norwegian CIMIC contribution was offered to NATO in the fall of 2002, and the elements were deployed from 5 February, 2003 to 13 February, 2004. Several of the sources I have used stem from this period of time, particularly news articles and official documents, but beyond that the sources I have used stem from a far bigger time-span, both of a newer and older date. Civil-military cooperation has been and still is an evolving concept, and I have studied the doctrinal and operational developments and understandings of the concept. The national decision-making process and formal proceedings concerning the CIMIC contribution to Afghanistan obviously precedes deployment. In this respect the time-frame as such appears as a bit artificial, as it is very much exceeded by the dating of relevant sources. Empirically the time-frame is accurate, as it comprises the time when a Norwegian CIMIC unit was offered and consequently deployed in Afghanistan.

The definition of “case study” has been somewhat disputed, and hence a multitude of definitions are available. Yin (2003:13) develops what he calls a technical definition, comprising two parts:

“A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. The case study inquiry copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis”

My study fits Yin's definition on these accounts, which justifies the chosen research design. One of the advantages with case-studies is the possibility to study a specific theme in depth, and hence provide thorough insights into the empirical phenomenon on the basis of qualitative data.

A general objection to case-studies is the lack of ability to produce general knowledge. Statistical generalization, that is "... an inference is made about a population (or universe) on the basis of empirical data collected about a sample" (Yin 2003:32), may not be drawn based on the case as cases are not "sampling units" (ibid). According to Yin, when doing case-studies the "...mode of generalization is "analytical generalization", in which a previously developed theory is used as a template with which to compare the empirical results of the case study" (ibid:32-33).

Afghanistan was chosen as the single case for a number of reasons. As mentioned in section 1.4 a comparative case-study would be too extensive. Other relevant cases could have been Bosnia, Kosovo and recently Iraq. I will draw on experiences from these operations, and especially from Kosovo. What makes Afghanistan particularly interesting is the fact that this was the first time Norway contributed with specifically designed CIMIC elements. Mockaitis (2004:2) claims that humanitarian interventions are perhaps the most challenging type of CIMIC operations. He lists Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo as examples of such operations, where the military force intervenes to end fighting, to establish and preserve order, facilitate relief operations, and aid in the rebuilding of infrastructure and civil institutions in what could be labelled a "failed state". The interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq suggest that CIMIC also has an important role to play in the war on terror. The hallmarks listed by Mockaitis must be considered relevant to these operations as well. In addition Stene (2005:47) refers to how some of her informants believed that the war on terror militarized the foreign policy of states and the humanitarian space, making civil-military issues even more pertinent after 11 September 2001.

### **3.3 Operationalizing the hypotheses**

To analyze the hypotheses I will make use of the different levels of the military organization. The highest level is the political-strategic level, represented by the Norwegian government. This level provides the defence- and security-political objectives of the nation, and stipulates how the collected strategic tools are to be utilized, including the military resources (FFOD A: 150). The military-strategic level is responsible for the deployment and utilization of the military resources of the state within a superior political framework to achieve political-strategic goals. In Norway this level is represented by the Chief of Defence Norway (CHODN) and his staff (ibid:148). The operational level is the connection between the military-strategic objectives and the tactical deployments in a particular operational area (ibid:149). According to Nissen (2002:6-7) the operational level is of less interest in international operations due to levels of command and control being “compressed” in such operations. I will not elaborate further on this claim in general, but make the assumption that in my particular case the operational level is rather less relevant. This assumption is supported by one CIMIC-officer who had what might be labelled an operational position in Afghanistan, saying that “In reality, everything we did were on a tactical level, but we were playing different roles.”<sup>21</sup> Accordingly the operational level will not be a part of the analysis. The tactical level is the utilization of military forces to achieve military objectives. This level is represented by the military units deployed to perform e.g. intelligence gathering, patrolling, combat missions, and for my purpose, civil-military cooperation.

When analyzing the first part of the research question, asking what explains the Norwegian decision to contribute with a CIMIC unit to Afghanistan, I will only discuss the political- and military-strategic levels, as the tactical level has not yet been activated.

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<sup>21</sup> Interview 23 August, 2005



In the second part of the research question, asking what explains the Norwegian approach to CIMIC, I will discuss this on the political-strategic and tactical levels, with the main focus placed on the tactical level.

### **3.3.1 Operationalizing the Rational Policy Model hypotheses**

The first hypothesis based on the assumptions of the rational policy model suggests that:

*H 1: To contribute with a civil-military cooperation unit to Afghanistan was a rational course of action maximizing Norwegian security-policy interests and military-strategic objectives.*

I will investigate how two Norwegian security-policy interests may have had an impact on the decision to contribute with a CIMIC unit to Afghanistan on the political-strategic level. The first interest would be to secure continued relevance for NATO. According to Whitepaper 1 (2002-2003, article 2.2) Norway is profoundly dependent on committed international security-political cooperation. NATO is the most important guarantor for Norwegian sovereignty and an absolute precondition for an effective Norwegian security policy. Norway supported the extension of NATO tasks and role in order to secure the relevance of NATO, whilst emphasising that a credible Article 5 must still form the basis of the Alliance. Secondly, it would be a Norwegian security-policy interest to position Norway with a relevant niche-capacity. The transformation of NATO involves the development of niche-capacities which the Alliance needs. This enables “small” NATO members to make meaningful contributions (Styrke og relevans 2004, article 170), and it entails an increased role-specialisation and division of labour within NATO (ibid: article 171).

Further on I will study how five military-strategic objectives may have had an impact on the decision to contribute with a CIMIC unit on the military-strategic level. The first is the

Norwegian participation in CIMIC Group North (CGN). The Norwegian engagement in this multinational framework would suggest that Norway is committed to developing CIMIC and deploying CIMIC elements. A second objective is cost-effectiveness. The armed forces will seek to pursue strategies creating consistency between political goals, military means and funding. As a military tool CIMIC is cost-effective. Another potential objective for contributing with a CIMIC unit is the possibility of invaluable experience and training. According to Whitepaper 1 (2002-2003, article 4.3.2) international military engagements contribute to a strengthening of competence and the quality of the armed forces. Further on it might be an objective to investigate CIMIC as a concept, aiming to sort out some of the conceptual confusion obscuring the concept. Finally it might be a military-strategic objective to contribute with CIMIC in order to further advance the development of a Norwegian CIMIC policy.

The second hypothesis based on the rational policy model suggests that:

*H 3: The Norwegian approach to civil-military cooperation in Afghanistan was a rational military approach maximizing Norwegian security-policy.*

The armed forces are a political instrument, and act primarily as a foreign policy tool. Often the most important motive behind Norwegian participation in PSOs and other military operations is to secure involvement in the decision-making processes concerning Norwegian security. To be able to secure such involvement it is important to commit visible force contributions. A visible force contribution would forward the two Norwegian security-policy interests identified in the previous part of this section. On the political-strategic level I will analyze how visibility became apparent in the Norwegian approach to CIMIC. To measure a “rational military approach” I will discuss how the Norwegian CIMIC elements acted in accordance with the NATO CIMIC doctrine and situational requirements. The point of departure will be the three core functions of CIMIC as

established in the NATO CIMIC doctrine, namely civil-military liaison, support to the civil environment and support to the force.

### **3.3.1.1 The validity of the Rational Policy Model hypotheses**

The link between the research question and the data material provided to respond to it is essential to the case-study method. This link is vital to the ability to generate valid conclusions. Underdal defines validity as “the extent to which a model succeeds in capturing the essence of the real-world phenomena it is intended to represent” (1984: 73). Yin labels it “construct validity”, defined as “establishing correct operational measures for the concepts being studied” (2003:34). He continues to state that the procedure to strengthen construct validity is to follow three steps (ibid). The first step is to use multiple sources of evidence. The second is to establish a chain of evidence, that is, to enable the reader to follow the derivation of any evidence. The third step is to have key informants review the draft case study report.

To investigate the first hypothesis I will study policy through official statements and documents. Frantzen (2005:3-4) quotes Frankel and emphasises the need to exercise caution in such an undertaking, as “a policy process is most of the time reactive and short term, geared towards imminent problems and challenges... coherence does not always exist between official, stated, long-term ambitions and the day-to-day policymaking process.” I hope to mend this by resorting to multiple sources of evidence. Interviews in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) will supplement the official documents and possibly shed some light on the day-to-day policymaking process. I have interviewed five MoD and MFA officials, whereas one MFA official had served as a diplomat in the Norwegian embassy in Kabul during the deployment of the Norwegian CIMIC unit. One of the MoD officials was a Senior Staff

Officer (SSO) with responsibility for CIMIC in CHODN's staff and later in the MoD when the two integrated in 2003.

The data used to study the second hypothesis is mainly interviews, but also a range of other sources such as scientific publications and newspaper articles. Hence multiple sources of evidence are secured. When relying on secondary literature it is important to be on guard towards the personal interpretations of the authors. The validity of newspaper articles might be a problem, as the articles may be biased by personal opinions, and as they are not subject to scientific standards. It is essential to be aware of this particularly as many both scientific and newspaper-articles written on the civil/military relationship tend to be biased in one way or the other. This may be avoided by using several and independent sources. I also gained access to a database made by the Norwegian Foreign Policy institute (NUPI) on KFOR V, containing 66 formal interviews of officers serving in KFOR V.

### **3.3.1.2 The reliability of the Rational Policy Model Hypotheses**

Reliability is according to Yin (2003:34) “demonstrating that the operations of a study – such as the data collections procedures – can be repeated, with the same results.” The point is that if the same case study was to be conducted once again by another investigator, he should arrive at the same findings and conclusions when following the same procedures. The goal is to minimize errors and biases (ibid:37). To achieve this it is important to document all steps during the study.

The official sources I rely on are easily accessible for a reliability-check. When it comes to the interviews in the Ministries they will be harder to repeat, as I did not follow an interview-guide. The interviews took rather the form of unstructured, informal

interviews<sup>22</sup> where I presented some framing topics and the officials talked at will, also introducing new topics. This method and the fact that the informants are anonymous presented me with interesting insights, but at the same time decreased the reliability.

The extensive use of interviews is the most evident reliability-challenge. I have interviewed five CIMIC-officers who have been deployed to Afghanistan. To achieve a broader perspective I have also interviewed one person who worked in the humanitarian sector in Afghanistan. The informants are anonymous. I used a recorder during most interviews, which increased the level of accuracy when transcribing the interviews. Two interviews were phone-interviews due to distance. The interviews were made during the spring, autumn and fall of 2005. The informants cover all three CIMIC elements, and are all men. They hold different military ranks, but I choose to call them all CIMIC-officers to secure their anonymity. The CIMIC-officers interviewed were presented with an interview guide, which more easily allows for repeat than the unstructured, informal interviews made at the Ministries. Still, the questions were open, allowing the respondent to formulate the answer as he pleased. The time-gap between the deployment and the interviews may have given rise to uncertainties in terms of memory-lapse. I hope to avoid this by means of cross-checking information using several independent sources, but still personal perceptions does not allow closer scrutiny and may weaken the reliability as such. Leading questions and misinterpretations are also possible pitfalls. I intended to mend this by using my first interview as a pilot-interview and subsequently made slight changes to the interview-guide based on this experience. I tried to avoid misinterpretations by letting the interviewees read through any part of the study where they had been quoted. Yet it is essential to acknowledge the existence of interpretations in interviews. This is inherent in the nature of interviews.<sup>23</sup> I have translated the interviews from Norwegian to English, and some of the interviewees did not quite recognize their

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<sup>22</sup> The reader is referred to read more in Hellevik (1999:108-109)

<sup>23</sup> The reader is referred to read more in Kvale (1997:17)

statements in English. In such cases the informants adjusted the statements when reading their final quotes. I have also translated quotes from Norwegian books and articles.

Internet transcriptions have been frequently used. Due to the vast amount of information available on the internet the search-strategy is essential. The internet has provided me with several kinds of information, such as public documents, articles and press releases. The use of internet sources is burdened with difficulties, especially when it comes to references and the possibility to re-examine the material. I attempt to mend this by stating the URL address and the time of reading in the bibliography, but there is no assurance that the site will not change the address or simply be removed from the web.

### **3.3.2 Operationalizing the culturalist hypotheses**

The culturalist hypotheses make the following presumptions:

*H 2: To contribute with a civil-military cooperation unit to Afghanistan was a Norwegian interest defined by Norwegian political and military organizational culture.*

*H 4: The Norwegian approach to civil-military cooperation in Afghanistan was a product of the Norwegian political and military organizational culture and the impact of social learning.*

Kier provides a comprehensive formula for operationalizing the independent variables political culture and military organizational culture. I will apply her operationalizations with some adjustments.

To identify the Norwegian political culture I will present civilian policymakers' beliefs about the role of the armed forces in society, in accordance with Kier's question presented

in section 2.2.2. Kier focuses on the role of the armed forces on the domestic arena. For my purpose it is important also to discuss how civilian policymakers' perceive the role of the armed forces beyond our borders.

In his book "The Norwegian defence tradition" (2002) Ståle Ulriksen argues that the Norwegian armed forces for almost two hundred years, and specially the last hundred, have been designed first and foremost to cover other needs than the purely military ones (ibid:19). Strategic, doctrinal and tactical military concerns have given way to political considerations, and the Norwegian defence establishment has been heavily influenced by Norwegian nation-building. Ulriksen seems to support Kier's assumption that the perception of the role of the military stems back to a state's experiences with the military in the state-building process. Ulriksen claims that according to the Norwegian defence tradition of 1905 the role of the Norwegian armed forces outside of Norwegian territory was largely neglected or toned down by the imparters of the tradition. The focus was rather on events on Norwegian soil (ibid:35). The defence-tradition of 1940 was very much similar to the tradition of 1905. Still military efforts were merely valued if the effort was a direct battle for Norwegian territory (ibid:187), conscription as such was more important than military efficiency (ibid: 199), and the symbol of military force was the conscripted infantry soldier on skis (ibid:228).

Terje Tvedt has developed the notion of "a national goodness-regime"<sup>24</sup> (2003:34). Tvedt writes that "...aid, human rights work and peace-policy have had an exceptional legitimacy in Norway" (2003:12), and continues "...the political leadership declared Norway as world-champion in aid, as the worlds best relief-nation, and as a humanitarian great power, almost without discussion, and with enthusiastic support..." (ibid:13). A national identity-producing project has been launched, tying the people's identity to helping the poor of the world and promoting peace (ibid:18). The project also gains legitimacy by means of its perceived power- emptiness (ibid:23, footnote 6). This profile,

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<sup>24</sup> "Et nasjonalt godhetsregime"

communicating Norway as a “Peace Nation” and Oslo as the “Peace City” has become Norway’s international brand (ibid:55). Though not dealt with by Tvedt, the Norwegian military plays an important role in his national goodness-regime by its regular participation in peacekeeping missions. Increasingly the perception of the role of the military in society has been tied to peacekeeping operations, and the discourse has been adjusted to the peace tradition.

Two indicators on the political culture emerge. The first emanates from the domestic arena, constituting the legacy from the defence traditions of 1905 and 1940, with its focus on military events on Norwegian soil. The second has a broader perspective. It takes as a point of departure the claim forwarded by Ulriksen that the Norwegian armed forces have been designed first and foremost to cover other needs than the purely military ones. The indicator suggests that promoting the Norwegian self-image as a “peace nation” will be a primary objective. In the analytical chapters I will investigate how these indicators of the Norwegian political culture may have had an impact on the decision to deploy a CIMIC unit and the consequent approach to CIMIC in Afghanistan.

As mentioned earlier, the elaboration on the military organizational culture will be limited to the army. This is not to suggest that there are great variances within the Norwegian defence establishment, but simply to limit the scope. This is not in line with Kier, who understands military culture as the organizational culture of a particular military, including all branches (1997:30). Her focus on the choice between offensive and defensive military doctrines makes for an abstraction from possible divergent military cultures within a national military establishment, whilst my focus on a specific force contribution allows me to focus on one branch.

As written earlier, Kier defines organizational culture as “...the set of basic assumptions, values, norms, beliefs and formal knowledge that shape collective understandings” (1997:28). Military organizational culture, as political culture, is a very broad concept,



encompassing a possibly inexhaustible range of indicators. I will focus on indicators relevant to peacekeeping in general and civil-military cooperation in particular. Those are motivations in the Norwegian military for participating in PSOs, attitudes towards the use of force and consent, aspirations to humanitarian efforts and the level of humanitarian activity in Norwegian contingencies, and role-perceptions. This list is certainly not complete, but serves my purpose of presenting a piece of the Norwegian army's military organizational culture in order to investigate my research question. In the following I will briefly present some research reflecting on these indicators, to provide a frame of reference.

Ness (quoted in Mæland 2004:155) has done research on what motivates Norwegian soldiers to apply for international operations. He found that economic profit, a spirit of adventure and professional challenges were important motivational factors, whilst contributing to peace and security played a marginal role. Mæland (ibid:44) found in his selection of Norwegian officers serving in Kosovo a motivational aspect of having "a job to do", distinct from more idealistic motives.

Nissen (2002:10-11) defines military organizational behaviour using the definition of traditional peacekeeping given in section 1.2.1 as a point of departure. Two important dimensions are the use of force and consent. Norway traditionally favours a minimum use of force and place consent high on the agenda.

Lunden (1999:107) lists three mental phases which a technical company of Norwegian soldiers deployed to Lebanon experienced in their attitudes towards aid to the local population. The phases went from "offensive optimism" through "laid-back disappointment" to "careful realism". It seems that the aspiration to do a humanitarian effort is present, but alters when increasingly confronted with the realities on the ground. Mæland (2004) points to similar tendencies in his material from Kosovo, where increased experience with the local population altered the perceptions of soldiers and officers when

it came to providing humanitarian efforts and activities. The Lebanese civilian population were according to Lunden (ibid: 159) generally content with the Norwegians. They were observed to hold a medium range military activity and a high humanitarian activity. A high military activity included a high level of military coerciveness and of protection offered to the local population.

The role-perception of soldiers and officers are changing and becoming more complex and multi-dimensional in accordance with the new security environment in which they are operating. For this “new” soldier Mæland (2004:146) emphasises the attitude, or virtue, of calmness<sup>25</sup>, which gives the owner the ability to keep the use of force on a low level and at the same time create and maintain good relations. Mæland implies that this attitude reflects the Norwegian mentality, and is a middle road between naiveté and the “Rambo-like” (ibid:147). In the book “The Postmodern Military” (Moskos et al. 2000) the authors depict a change in the dominant military profession-type, moving from the “combat leader” during the world wars, via the “manager and technician” during the Cold War, to three kinds of postmodern soldier-types. The first kind is the “soldier-scholar”, represented by an intellectual and highly educated soldier able to take upon him demanding tasks for defence purposes. The second kind is the “soldier-statesman”, a soldier that govern the public and international room, such as by dealing with the media, or holding diplomatic skills enabling the soldier to cooperate with local authorities and non-governmental parties in a given conflict area (Moskos 2000:15-19). Mæland (2004:269-270) suggests the label “humanitarian military”, defined as soldiers who in a broad sense uses their military power to forward conditions for human life and development and does it in a way concurrent with the military mission (ibid:294). Mæland (ibid) stresses the existence of such hybrid soldiers, who are both military and humanitarian in their professional spirit, and emphasises the link between those two roles as being of the essence.

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<sup>25</sup> Sindighet

Kier (ibid.:30) makes three points about what the military organizational culture is not. First, it is not equal to “national character”. She acknowledges that a military culture may reflect some aspects of its society’s culture, but claims that the powerful assimilation mechanisms at play in the military can displace the influence of the civilian society. Second, military culture is not equivalent to strategic culture. The military organizational culture does not refer to the beliefs of civilian policymakers, which is rather incorporated into the political culture. Third, military culture and “military mind” must not be confused. Military culture does not refer to a general set of values and attitudes shared by all militaries. Military culture refers to “the organizational culture of particular militaries; it does not refer to the organizational culture of the military in general” (ibid.). On this last point I will embark on a slightly other path than Kier. Believing that it is not viable to study Norwegian military organizational culture in isolation, I will anticipate that social learning is occurring, influencing the military organizational culture at the tactical level. Social learning is measured by means of informants commenting on previous experiences with CIMIC, attendance to international training courses and social interaction with other contingencies during deployment.

### **3.3.2.1 The validity and reliability of the culturalist hypotheses**

To analyze the culturalist hypotheses I will rely on primary and secondary sources. I will follow Kier’s advice and look for documents the military produces for its internal consumption, such as articles in military magazines, reports, briefs and doctrines. Documents produced to communicate with outsiders, and policymakers in particular, carry with it the difficulty in distinguishing “political expediency from genuine beliefs” (ibid:31). Still, the sources I have access to are not classified, and accordingly available to a public audience. Again I hope to resolve this by means of multiple and independent sources. The literature on Norwegian military culture is limited. Due to the contested concept of “culture”, the validity must be questioned. Am I really measuring what I intend

to measure? I have developed a number of indicators crystallized from the political and military organizational culture with a suggested relevance to civil-military cooperation. I will draw on the interview-material I have collected, and my remarks on reliability made before are valid for the culturalist hypotheses as well.

## Part 3: Background

### 4. Civil-military cooperation in theory and practice

*“The sooner I can get rid of the questions that are outside the military in scope, the happier I will be! Sometimes, I think I live ten years each week, of which at least nine are absorbed in political and economic matters...And what a lot of headaches I found. Water supply shortage, no power, no food, no fuel, and corpses all over town...”*

General Dwight D. Eisenhower

In this chapter I will elaborate on civil-military cooperation, insert it into its historical, theoretical and practical context and present my case. First I will briefly draw some historical lines, before describing different CIMIC doctrines. Next I will present the civil component of a PSO, before placing CIMIC in the civil-military interface and briefly describing the Norwegian CIMIC discipline. Subsequently I will present my case, starting with a description of the crisis and the consequent military and humanitarian engagement in Afghanistan, before narrowing the scope to CIMIC in Afghanistan.

#### **4.1 A brief historical overview**

War has always involved an encounter between civil and military components. Mockaitis (2004:1) claims that “... civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) is arguably as old as warfare itself...” Yet this encounter has become increasingly complex, demanding efficient tools to facilitate coordination and cooperation.

According to Greve and Hertzberg (2001:11) the concept of CIMIC emerged during the Second World War. The U.S. established what they named “Civilian Affairs” (CA) responsible for the reconstruction of liberated areas. CA cooperated with civilians and contributed with capacities to reconstruct infrastructure and with humanitarian aid. Rana

(2004:571) emphasizes that both the concept of civil-military cooperation and that of civil affairs have been part of the major military operations of the twentieth century.

The SSO emphasised that CIMIC is not new in NATO. The NATO School has been teaching CIMIC courses since the 1980s, if not before. Yet experiences from the military operations in the Balkans during the 1990s prompted NATO to execute a complete examination and revision of NATO policy (MC 411/1) and doctrine (AJP-9) on CIMIC. Simultaneously NATO allies were encouraged to establish CIMIC units.<sup>26</sup> The growing importance of civil-military cooperation was also reflected in the policy and doctrines of the UN and the European Union (EU). In the next section I will present certain CIMIC doctrines, with a particular focus on the NATO CIMIC doctrine.

## **4.2 CIMIC doctrines**

### **4.2.1 NATO**

The military and political transformations following the end of the Cold War spurred the evolvment of a new NATO Strategic Concept in 1991. A few years' later NATO leaders realized that the Concept needed a re-examination due to the alteration of the strategic landscape since its adoption. In 1999 a new Strategic Concept was approved, aiming at equipping and guiding the Alliance for the new security challenges and opportunities of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. According to Frantzen (2005:2) it can be argued that during the 1990s PSOs became the most tangible and visible sign of NATO's new role. In Article 10 of the new Security Concept, the Alliance admits it to be a fundamental security task "...to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations." In Article 60 the Alliance acknowledges that "The interaction between alliance forces and the civil environment (both governmental and non-governmental) in which they operate is crucial to the success of operations."

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<sup>26</sup> Interview 23 September, 2005

The primary objective of Allied Joint Publication 9 (AJP-9) “NATO Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) Doctrine” is to provide guidelines for the planning and execution of CIMIC in support of operations involving NATO military forces. AJP-9 was ratified 10 May, 2004.<sup>27</sup> NATO policy for CIMIC is laid down in Military Council 411/1, which came into force in 2001. NATO defines CIMIC as follows:

“The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies” (MC 411/1).

The definition states that NATO conducts CIMIC in support of the military mission. CIMIC as defined enables a Commander to interface with the civil components in the operational theatre and to fully absorb civilian parameters into his planning. CIMIC is intended to contribute to the establishment of a stable environment and to facilitate the reaching of the end-state. CIMIC is the Commander’s tool for building effective relationships, and harmonise civil-military interaction. We may identify three dimensions towards which CIMIC efforts are to be directed. These dimensions constitute the civilian component, and are the local authorities, the national population and the civilian humanitarian sector.

The purpose of CIMIC is twofold:

“The immediate purpose of CIMIC is to establish and maintain the full co-operation of the NATO commander and the civilian authorities, organisations, agencies and population within a commander’s area of operations in order to allow him to fulfil his mission...The long-term purpose of CIMIC is to help create and sustain conditions that will support the achievement of Alliance objectives in operations” (MC 411/1, article 9).

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<sup>27</sup> Interview 23 August, 2005

According to AJP-9 (article 103-1) CIMIC is applicable to both Article 5 Collective Defence Operations and non Article 5 CROs. The context and profile of CIMIC will be different depending on the nature of the crisis or operation. In Article 5 operations the focus of CIMIC is likely to be narrower than in a non Article 5 operation where the focus of CIMIC is expected to be broader and more complex.

CIMIC has three core functions (AJP-9, article 104-1). The first is civil-military liaison. The purpose is to provide the coordination necessary to facilitate and support the planning and conduct of operations. Civil-military liaison is being established at the political, strategic and operational levels with the civilian component. Liaison is the most important core function. It implies that connections are being established through the creation of structures and channels for communication. The second core function is support to the civil environment. This core function covers a number of CIMIC activities, and may involve a range of military resources, such as information, personnel, materiel, equipment, communications facilities, specialist expertise or training. AJP-9 article 104-1-b continues to state that “It will generally only take place where and when it is required to create conditions necessary for the fulfilment of the military mission and/or because the appropriate civil authorities and agencies are unable to carry out the task.” The third core function is support to the force, acknowledging that NATO commanders to varying degrees will be dependent on different kinds of civilian support from within the operational theatre such as civilian resources, information, and tacit civilian support for the operations. CIMIC plays an essential role in obtaining such support.

According to AJP-9 article 203 a number of principles govern the civil-military relationship. The first principle is cultural awareness. This implies that the military must seek a sound understanding of local culture, customs and laws. The second principle underlines that common objectives shared by NATO forces and civilian organizations should wherever possible be established and recognised. Thirdly the analysis of common



objectives should lead to an agreed sharing of responsibilities. The fourth principle governing civil-military relations is that every effort should be made to secure consent, which is the willing cooperation of civilian organizations. The fifth principle is that CIMIC tasks and activities should be transparent, and the last principle underscores the essence of maintaining open and constant communication.

MC 411/1 article 11 underlines that the military will normally only be responsible for security related tasks and for support to the appropriate civil authority. It is only in exceptional circumstances that the military may be required to take on tasks normally the responsibility of a mandated civil authority, organization or agency. These tasks are only to be assumed by the military if an otherwise unacceptable vacuum would arise. The responsibility for such civil related tasks will be handed over to the appropriate civil authority of agency as soon as possible and in a smooth a manner as possible.

CIMIC Coordination Centres (CCC) are an important part of the CIMIC concept. According to AJP-9 article 502.2 the key functions of CCCs are to a) Provide initial points of contact; b) Provide a focal point for liaison; c) Facilitate information exchange; d) Provide advice on the availability and mechanics of military assistance to civilian organisations; and e) Re-enforce the legitimacy of the Force in the eyes of civil authorities and the local population.

A useful exercise could be to sort out what CIMIC is not (Rollins 2001:123). CIMIC is not military assistance to civil authorities. This kind of assistance is usually given in connection with natural disasters and the like. Nor is CIMIC civil emergency planning, which primarily concerns the protection of civilian populations. CIMIC is not civil affairs (CA). CA is an American construct which I will elaborate on in section 4.2.4. Last, but not least, CIMIC is not “nation building”, as this is the domain of the international community and NATO per definition does not engage in “nation building”.

#### **4.2.2 The UN**

One main difference between a NATO operation and a UN peace operation is that in addition to a military force and/or observer component, a UN peace operation will always have a political or diplomatic authority. In most cases this function will be filled by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). A NATO operation has no political authority at the operational level, and hence the military commanders are to directly establish contact with the civilian agents. The SRSG will seek to harmonize the operational objectives of the political, military and humanitarian components of the mission (Hatzenbichler 2001:117-118). The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) defines Civil Military Coordination as follows:

“UN Civil-Military Coordination is the system of interaction, involving exchanges of information, negotiation, de-confliction, mutual support, and planning at all levels between military elements and humanitarian organizations, development organizations, or the local civilian population, to achieve respective objectives” (DPKO 2000, article 8).

A source of some confusion is the fact that the UN has developed two definitions of civil-military coordination. The other definition originates from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The definition for UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) is:

“The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training” (OCHA 2003: 5).

In the literature both definitions are referred to as the UN CIMIC doctrine. The DPKO definition defines the civilian component more in line with the NATO doctrine, though

leaving out the local authorities. This is perhaps due to the SRSG function described above. The OCHA definition seemingly limits the civilian component to humanitarian actors. Whilst the NATO definition stress the military mission, the DPKO UN definition emphasise civil-military cooperation as a concept and a mechanism to create a common understanding and a proper point of departure to reach both military and civilian goals (Jensen 2003:10). Whilst the DPKO definition focuses on “respective objectives”, OCHA CIMIC opens for pursuing common goals. The UN wording, “Civil-military Coordination”, is not random. According to the IASC<sup>28</sup> reference paper (2004:7): “... cooperation – the closer form of coordination – with belligerent forces should in principle not take place, unless in extreme and exceptional circumstances and as a last resort.”

#### **4.2.3 The EU**

In 2003 the European Council approved the European security strategy “A Secure Europe in a Better World.” The security strategy states that (2003:7) “In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments.” The EU has worked to establish a crisis-management capability to be part of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for a long period of time. According to Whitepaper 39 (2003-2004, article 6.4) it has been a main goal for the EU to secure a comprehensive approach to crisis-management, e.g. by developing both civilian and military tools. The EU was ready to lead civil and military crisis-management operations in 2003. EU CIMIC is defined as:

“Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) is the co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between military components of EU-led Crisis Management Operations and civil actors

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<sup>28</sup> The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) was grounded in 1992 in response to the General Assembly Resolution 46/182 calling for strengthened coordination of humanitarian assistance ([www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/](http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/))

(external to the EU), including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.”<sup>29</sup>

The wording of the EU CIMIC definition is essentially equal to the NATO definition, and stresses that the CIMIC functions should be executed in support of the EU military mission.

#### **4.2.4 U.S. and U.K. Civil-Military Operations**

Civil-military operations (CMO) are the equivalent to NATO CIMIC in U.S. and U.K. doctrine. The related concepts of civil affairs, civil affairs activities and civil-military operations are defined as follows by the U.S. Department of Defense:

Civil Affairs: “Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations.”

Civil Affairs activities: “Activities performed or supported by civil affairs that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present; and (2) involve application of civil affairs functional specialty skills, in areas normally the responsibility of civil government, to enhance conduct of civil-military operations.”

Civil-military operations: “The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational

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<sup>29</sup>[http://ares.apan-info.net/QuickPlace/te8reliefweb/Main.nsf/\\$defaultview/ABB1BCF8C0FE86AC0A256EBD00011724/\\$File/Glossary%20CMCoord.pdf?OpenElement](http://ares.apan-info.net/QuickPlace/te8reliefweb/Main.nsf/$defaultview/ABB1BCF8C0FE86AC0A256EBD00011724/$File/Glossary%20CMCoord.pdf?OpenElement) (read 24 July, 2005)

US objectives... Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces.”<sup>30</sup>

As pointed out by Rana (2004:572) the scope of the U.S. CA doctrine differs from the CIMIC doctrine of NATO. NATO perceive CIMIC as a function to improve coordination with the civilian component, and the NATO CIMIC doctrine is not project-oriented, yet does not rule out the possibility of CIMIC conducting humanitarian projects provided they support the military mission. The CA approach of the U.S. seems inclined to influence the civilian environment in support of their armed forces. CMO’s may substitute for civilian authorities and organizations. According to one CIMIC-officer “CIMIC does not equal British CA. CA implies adjusting the civil society to the needs of the force, that is to manipulate the civil society in good colonial tradition.”<sup>31</sup>

In the literature there seem to be a general confusion of CA and CMO. CA is according to the definition designated personnel, whilst CMO is what they perform. The U.S. CMO definition also states that forces other than CA can conduct CMO.

According to one CIMIC-officer also Norway has employed the concept of CMO in previous operations. The officer actually prefers this label, as it implies an operational intent.<sup>32</sup>

#### ***4.3 The civilian component in a peace support operation***

There are several categorizations of the civilian actors in a peace support operation. AJP-9 (chapter 8) suggests three principal types of civilian organizations compromising the civilian humanitarian sector. According to the doctrine (article 801), “It is critical that

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<sup>30</sup> Department of Defense (DOD) Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Chiefs of Staff Library (read 26 July 2005): <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/index.html>

<sup>31</sup> Interview 1 June, 2005

<sup>32</sup> Interview 13 May, 2005

CIMIC personnel fully understand the mandate, role, structure, methods and principles of these organisations to establish an effective relationship with them.” The first group are International Organizations (IOs) established by intergovernmental agreements such as the various UN organisations and the OSCE. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) also belongs to this group.<sup>33</sup> The second group consist of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), which are voluntary organisations with their own charters and missions. International and National Donor Agencies also belong to this group. The third group is called “other groupings” which is perceived to be within the above generic types. It consists of agencies such as Civilian Development Agencies and Human Rights and Democratisation Agencies.

Greve and Hertzberg (2001:12) also include the civilian population and local and regional authorities when they classify civilian actors. When speaking about civilian actors or the civilian component, it is vital to include these two groups, but when we are talking about the civilian humanitarian sector these groups should be left out. Hence the civilian component is made up of three groups, the civilian humanitarian sector, the civilian population and local authorities. CIMIC is instrumental in dealing with all these groups.

The civilian population may be divided into several ethnic groups, some defined as part of the conflict, other as victims. The local or regional authorities may be comprised of politicians, the police, religious leaders, the public administration etc. It is crucial to recognize that each conflict is unique, and the civilian component will differ exceedingly from conflict to conflict.

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<sup>33</sup> The ICRC is an impartial, neutral and independent organisation, having a unique status as it fulfils the role conferred upon it by the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the Additional Protocols of 1977 and the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement adopted in 1986.


#### ***4.4 CIMIC in the civilian-military interface***

The civilian humanitarian sector has often been reluctant to collaborate with the military component. Lia and Hansen (1998:28) label this “a clash of cultures”. They stress the existence of a number of objections, mutual prejudices and stereotypes due to dissimilar organizational cultures and operating procedures, different identities, different time horizons and differences in composition when it comes to gender. The military puts emphasis on structure, order and hierarchy, discipline and clear lines of command. The civil humanitarian sector may be distinguished by an informal, improvised and egalitarian organizational structure (ibid). The civilian humanitarian sector fears that civil-military collaboration will compromise their impartiality, neutrality and independence. A CIMIC-officer quotes some general stereotypes in the NGO conception of the military: ““boys with toys”, rigid, authoritarian, conservative, impatient, arrogant, civilian-phobic, excessively security minded”, and stereotypes in the military about NGOs: “Non-guided organisations, left-wing children of the 60s, useless do-gooders, undisciplined, unpunctual, anarchic, self-righteous, and usually anti-military.”<sup>34</sup> Stene (2005:75) does not validate the existence of such stereotypes in her study, but still finds that there are traceable misconceptions due to the fact that conflicts justify the existence of both players in a given operational theatre, giving rise to scepticism. Stene further stresses the need for and necessity of increased understanding of the respective roles and mandates of civilian and military players. The interdependent character of civil-military cooperation underlines this need (MC 411/1, article 1).

The international response to conflicts usually involves a sequence of short and long term stabilization efforts. Figure 4.1 (Rollins 2001:124) depicts what the military should do on the top half, and what the mandated civilian actors, such as the examples illustrated, should do at the bottom. This is the ideal division of labour. The reality has proven very different and the military have been involved in all activities at the bottom half.


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<sup>34</sup> Interview 5 August, 2005



**Figure 4.1 Task relationships between NATO and the civilian organizations – the ideal**

Accepting that the military level of involvement in reality does not follow the ideal depicted in figure 4.1, new challenges arise as to how far the level of involvement should go and which procedures should govern it (Rollins 2001:124). Figure 4.2 is a simplistic representation of the correlation of civil and military involvement in civil-related activities (Jensen 2003:21):



**Figure 4.2 CIMIC transition**

At the beginning, the military forces are involved in wide range of civilian tasks. As the civilian players increasingly take on them the civil-related activities, a corresponding decline in military involvement should occur. The interception will be the point where the



“transition” of responsibilities takes place. The military are perceived to be taking on civilian tasks in order to fill a vacuum, and the civilian actors are intended to take them over as soon as possible. In reality, the transition to the civilian component is much less smooth than the figure suggests, and the military are usually engaged in civil-related matters much longer than anticipated. Transition to civil control is a key component for reaching the end-state of a PSO.

#### **4.5 Norwegian CIMIC**

According to Greve and Hertzeberg (2001:11) the Norwegian armed forces had its first serious encounter with CIMIC in IFOR, operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the period 1995-1996. Before IFOR Norwegian procedure had been to have a humanitarian/judicial adviser in the Norwegian battalions. Lia and Hansen wrote in 1997 (51-52) that CIMIC was not institutionalized in Norway, despite the existence of working groups and forums and an improvement of the informal and formal cooperation between the Norwegian armed forces and humanitarian organizations. Greve and Hertzeberg (2001:21) conclude that “Our inquiries have not established whether the Norwegian government have any kind of vision, intention, policy or goal for civil-military cooperation in a peace support operation. The political agenda seems to be missing.” Seemingly Ruset (2001:107) supports this conclusion:

“Despite increased emphasis on international operations and a general acceptance at political and military professional levels of the importance of civil-military cooperation in international operations, this is not reflected in the Norwegian approach to such operations. Lacking statistical evidence, I will claim that Norwegian (civil and military) efforts in the Balkans are not coordinated”

Nissen (2002) focus on the understanding of CIMIC among Norwegian military personnel. He (2002:73) expected the Norwegian armed forces, due to its experiences

from traditional peacekeeping and the alleged emphasis on consent, to be in the forefront regarding CIMIC. His expectation was only to some extent. He points to the lack of CIMIC-courses at the Military Academy and the Joint Staff College, the lack of extensive experience with Norwegian officers performing CIMIC functions in Kosovo, unsatisfactory lectures and training and the lack of written guidelines and handbooks. CIMIC turned out to be quite unfamiliar terrain to Norwegian military personnel serving in Kosovo. Nissen (2002:74) concludes that “In general it seemed to be no common understanding of the concept among Norwegian personnel.”

As the doctrinal work and CIMIC-focus accelerated in NATO, nations were encouraged to establish CIMIC units as mentioned before. Norway made a commitment to establish a CIMIC unit operational as of 1 January, 2003, and agreed to be a part of CIMIC Group North (CGN). The Norwegian CIMIC unit consists of three CIMIC elements, and belongs administratively to the army’s reaction force. All elements have 16 CIMIC-officers on readiness-contracts signed for a period of two to three years, in addition to a leading element consisting of four CIMIC-officers. This amounts to 52 officers on contracts ready to deploy in 30 days. Consequently the armed forces have CIMIC officers prepared at any time for deployment to international operations such as the ones in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The CIMIC unit was originally lead by a lieutenant-colonel and established as a section at the Norwegian Defence Staff College (NODSC).<sup>35</sup> The daily work was run by four lieutenant-colonels and a civilian. They taught CIMIC at the NODSC, and functioned as a centre for CIMIC competence (Kvam 2002:14). Due to the reorganization of the NODSC the CIMIC section there has been closed down, with only one CIMIC position remaining. The CIMIC positions have been moved to other parts of the military organization such as the army’s transformation- and doctrine-command (TRADOK).<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> Forsvarets Stabsskole (FSTS)

<sup>36</sup> Interview 6 April, 2005

In the middle of 1999 the Netherlands suggested to establish a CIMIC Group North (CGN) aiming at coordinating and leading the many national CIMIC units in future operations. Germany agreed to this suggestion, and together they invited NATO countries in the northern region to establish a CGN. U.K. turned the invitation down, as they had been asked to establish an Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) CIMIC Group. Island and Luxembourg also turned the offer down, whilst Belgium agreed to a limited participation. The consequent members of CGN are the Netherlands, Germany, Poland, Norway, the Czech Republic and Denmark. Italy was in charge of the establishment of a CIMIC Group South. CGN was subsequently established in September 2001. The CGN headquarter (HQ CGN) is located in the Dutch city of Budel.<sup>37</sup> In January 2003 CGN formally received its status as a NATO International Military Headquarters. It is functionally attached to Regional Headquarters Allied Forces North Europe (RHQ AFNORTH). CGN will provide NATO Commanders with a co-ordinated approach to civil-military expertise.<sup>38</sup>

## ***4.6 The intervention in Afghanistan and Norwegian engagement***

The Norwegian military engagement in Afghanistan must be seen in connection with the civilian contributions Norway has provided to the country. But before elaborating on this I will briefly present the historical background for the international community's intervention in Afghanistan.

### **4.6.1 Brief historical background**

The 11<sup>th</sup> of September 2001 New York and Washington were hit by terrorism on a horrifying scale. The war-like theatres consequently unfolding in the economic and

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<sup>37</sup> CGN elaboration by SSO, 23 September, 2005

<sup>38</sup> Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) (read 25 September, 2005): <http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/cimic.htm>

military centres of the superpower suggested the entrance of a new age of terrorism, ending the period labelled the post-Cold War era. Leaders from around the world were unified in denouncing the attacks against the United States and in offering their support.

The investigation soon pointed to the Saudi-born dissident Osama Bin Laden and his al-Qaeda organisation. President Bush acknowledged that “This will be a different kind of conflict against a different kind of enemy.” He continued to assert that “Victory against terrorism will not take place in a single battle, but in a series of decisive actions against terrorist organizations and those who harbor and support them.”<sup>39</sup> International attention was directed towards Afghanistan and its Taliban government suspected of hiding leaders of al-Qaeda and constituting a hotbed for terrorists. The demands presented by President Bush were non-negotiable. He called for immediate action, and asserted that the Taliban must “...hand over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate”.<sup>40</sup> Afghanistan was labelled a “failed state” and regarded as a potential safe haven for drug production and terrorists.

The international community was unified in its purpose towards Afghanistan. “The government fully supports the US-led military operations against the terror network in Afghanistan. It is now clear that Afghanistan is a base for a network of terror operations. Consequently the use of military power is necessary.” These are the words of the Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg on 7 October, 2001, the initiation day of the campaign in Afghanistan.<sup>41</sup> The MoD official in my interview material emphasised the fact that the Norwegian participation in Afghanistan was uncontroversial and supported by a majority in parliament.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> Radio Address of the President to the Nation (read 28 January, 2004):  
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010915.html>

<sup>40</sup> Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People (read 28 January, 2004):  
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>

<sup>41</sup> Press release nr.: 186/2001 (read 28 March, 2004):

<http://odin.dep.no/odinarkiv/norsk/dep/smk/2001/presse/001001-070394/index-dok000-b-n-a.html>

<sup>42</sup> Interview 20 May, 2005

Afghanistan is located in Southern Asia, bordering on China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. 84% of the approximately 28,700,000 inhabitants are Sunni Muslim.<sup>43</sup> Afghanistan is a landlocked country in extreme poverty, and a society that has seen many conflicts. The terrible conflict of most recent times began in 1979. A civil war triggered a Soviet intervention aiming at installing a Soviet-friendly regime. The Soviet military occupation lasted until 1989, pitting Western backed Islamic rebels against the Soviet forces and their local allies. Anti-Communist mujahedin forces with foreign training and supplies eventually forced a Soviet withdrawal. Losing its unifying force the Islamic forces split into several factions and continued to fight among themselves. By 1996 the Taliban had won control of the capital, Kabul, but the country was still in a state of war. In October 2001 the Afghan crisis took a new turn. The Taliban's refusal to surrender Osama bin Laden to the U.S. resulted in the formation of a U.S.-led international coalition. The Taliban was ousted from power on 17 November 2001 after several weeks of bombardment and military action on the ground by coalition forces.<sup>44</sup>

On 5 December 2001 the Agreement on provisional arrangements in Afghanistan pending the re-establishment of permanent government institutions, known as the Bonn Agreement, was signed. The second part of the Bonn Agreement states that an Interim Authority should be established in December 2001 (article I.1). Subsequently the agreement prescribed an Emergency Loya Jirga to be convened, and to decide on a Transitional Authority to lead Afghanistan "...until such time as a fully representative government can be elected through free and fair elections to be held no later than two years from the date of the convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga" (article I.4). The agreement further prescribes that "A Constitutional Loya Jirga shall be convened within eighteen months of the establishment of the Transitional Authority, in order to adopt a new constitution for

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<sup>43</sup> CIA-The World Factbook (read 18 March, 2004):  
[www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/af.html](http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/af.html)

<sup>44</sup> Global Policy Forum: Afghanistan (read 22 March, 2004):  
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/afgindx.htm>

Afghanistan” (article I.6). The Emergency Loya Jirga took place in Kabul from 15 to 22 June 2002. The Transitional Authority was established, a constitution was drafted and a Constitutional Loya Jirga convened in mid-December 2003 (Suhrke et al. 2004:27). In January the new Constitution was signed, and in October 2004 Hamid Karzai was elected President of Afghanistan<sup>45</sup>. Afghanistan held its first parliamentary elections in September 2005.

The G-8 countries have initiated a series of programmes within Security Sector Reforms. ”Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration” (DDR) of the previous Afghan Army is lead by Japan. The U.K. is in charge of an anti-narcotics programme, reconstruction of the Afghan Army is lead by the U.S. and reconstruction of the police force is lead by Germany. Italy is in charge of the revision and reconstruction of the juridical sector. According to Nermo (2005:11) the programmes have varied in their progression, where the DDR process and the reconstruction of the Army is progressing the most, whilst the development of the juridical sector seems to be lagging behind.

#### **4.6.2 The military engagement in Afghanistan**

Afghanistan was confirmed as a top-priority of NATO on the NATO summit in Istanbul in June 2004. Afghanistan is also a main priority for Norwegian military commitments abroad. All branches in the Norwegian armed forces have committed forces to Afghanistan, in addition to joint capacities. Seemingly, the Norwegian military contributions to Afghanistan contain two extremes. Norway has contributed with forces to the American-lead peace enforcement operation called Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), as part of the war against terror. At the same time Norway has committed forces to the peacekeeping operation of ISAF, which is a stabilisation force part of the efforts to “win the peace”. According to Leerand (2003:18) this is no contradiction, but rather two

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<sup>45</sup> CIA-The World Factbook (ibid)

sides of the same story. Peace and progress presupposes the absence of terror and insecurity.

#### **4.6.2.1 Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF**

The military phase of the war against terror began on 7 October, 2001, and the operation was named Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).<sup>46</sup> U.S. and British forces launched air strikes against Afghan targets striving to overthrow Taliban and wreck the al-Qaeda network. The initial military objectives included the destruction of terrorist training camps and infrastructure, the capture of al-Qaeda leaders and the termination of terrorist activities in Afghanistan.<sup>47</sup> In the south eastern region of the country the U.S. lead coalition are at the time of writing still engaged in a war against alleged terrorists and Taliban remnants. Norwegian military resources were soon offered. “Our own security is close and inextricably linked to the outcome of the fight against international terrorism. Therefore we must be prepared to take our share of the military burdens” stated the Minister of Defence, Kristin Krohn Devold.<sup>48</sup>

The Norwegian force contribution to OEF included Special Forces, with special capacities such as undertaking operations in hard winter conditions. Norway also contributed with mine clearing and one Hercules C – 130 transport aircraft with personnel. The first phase of the Norwegian contributions to OEF was finalised in the summer of 2002.<sup>49</sup> The transport aircraft contribution was terminated in October 2002, the same month as Norway contributed with six F-16 jet fighters to be stationed on the base in Manas,

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<sup>46</sup> One CIMIC-officer emphasize that the UNSC mandate constitutes the main difference between OEF and ISAF (interview 1 June, 2005). Whether OEF was authorized by UNSC resolution 1368 and article 51 in the UN Charter is subjected to continued disputes.

<sup>47</sup> Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People (ibid)

<sup>48</sup> Press release nr.: 062/2001 (read 11 February, 2004):

<http://odin.dep.no/fd/norsk/aktuelt/presse/010011-070134/index-dok000-b-n-a.html>

<sup>49</sup> MoD: “Norske bidrag i Afghanistan – status 1. juli 2002” (read 11 February, 2004):

<http://www.odin.dep.no/fd/norsk/publ/veiledninger/010011-120039/index-dok000-b-n-a.html>

Kyrgyzstan. Norway cooperated with Denmark and the Netherlands with the main mission of supporting OEF field operations. The mission was terminated in April 2003.<sup>50</sup> By the autumn of 2003, Norway had shifted focus from the U.S.-led OEF to the international stabilisation force, ISAF. The main impetus for this was probably the NATO takeover of ISAF command in August 2003.

#### **4.6.2.2 International Security and Assistance Force, ISAF**

In accordance with the Bonn Agreement, the UNSC passed a resolution on 20 December, 2001 authorizing the deployment of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to Kabul and its surrounding areas.<sup>51</sup> ISAF is not a UN force, but a coalition of the willing. Initially the leadership of ISAF was rotational every sixth month. The first ISAF mission was lead by the U.K., the second by Turkey, and the third ISAF mission was run by Germany and the Netherlands with support from NATO. NATO assumed the ISAF leadership in August 2003. This commitment was a watershed in NATO history, being its first mission outside the Euro-Atlantic area. In October 2003 UNSC resolution 1510 provided for the "...progressive expansion of the International Security and Assistance Force to other urban centres and other areas beyond Kabul." This was a long-sought extension. ISAF's aim is to assist the Government of Afghanistan in maintaining security within its area of operation. ISAF supports the Government of Afghanistan in expanding its authority to the rest of the country, and in providing a safe and secure environment. ISAF currently numbers around 8,000 troops from 36 NATO, nine partner and two non-NATO / non-partner countries.<sup>52</sup>

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
<sup>50</sup> MoD: "Status norske bidrag til "Enduring Freedom" og ISAF" (read 11 February, 2004): <http://www.odin.dep.no/fd/norsk/aktuelt/nyheter/010011-210120/index-dok000-b-n-a.html>

<sup>51</sup> S/RES/1386 (2001)

<sup>52</sup> NATO in Afghanistan Factsheet (read 25 September, 2005): <http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/040628-factsheet.htm>



Norway was one of 16 signatories to the agreement on ISAF in January, 2002. Norway's initial military contribution to ISAF in early 2002 was modest compared to the OEF contributions. The contribution included a transport control (MOVCON) team and an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team. The EOD team cleared mines and undetonated explosives in Kabul and its surrounding areas. The MOVCON team was stationed on the Kabul airport and provided certain ground functions.<sup>53</sup> In February 2003 Norway had deployed a CIMIC element, by August the same year a surgical hospital unit, and by November a guard and security company functioning as a rapid reaction force, Telemark Task Force I (TTF I).<sup>54</sup> The surgical hospital unit was first and foremost an emergency hospital for ISAF, but also treated local patients when possible. TTF I contributed to securing the implementation of the Loja Jirga process. In March 2004 TTF I was replaced by TTF II. TTF II was replaced by the Norwegian Squadron (NorSqn) which is part of Battle Group 3 (BG 3) under Norwegian leadership. Simultaneously Norway made a contribution to a British-lead PRT originally part of the OEF but later transferred to ISAF.



Figure

#### 4.3 Norwegian force contributions and number of personnel deployed to Afghanistan<sup>55</sup>

<sup>53</sup> Pressrelease MoD Nr. 066/2001 (read 11 February 2004):

<http://www.odin.dep.no/fd/norsk/aktuell/pressem/010011-070138/index-dok000-b-f-a.html>

<sup>54</sup> MoD: "Status norske bidrag til "Enduring Freedom" og ISAF" (ibid)

<sup>55</sup> Figure from Hærfra nr. 6 June 2004: 2, reprinted with permission

#### **4.6.3 The civilian and humanitarian engagement in Afghanistan**

In combination with the military commitments, Norway upgraded its humanitarian engagement, gradually focusing on long-term forms of assistance. In 2004 Afghanistan was designated as one of Norway's development "partner countries" (Suhrke et al. 2004:55). Norwegian NGOs have been engaged with Afghanistan since the 1980s. In September 2001 only the Norwegian Afghanistan Committee and Norwegian Church Aid were present in Afghanistan. During 2002, the Norwegian Refugee Council and Save the Children Norway established themselves in Kabul (Suhrke et al. 2004:59). According to Stene (2005:34) an estimated 1600 NGOs operate in Afghanistan, of which 1200 are registered.

When the Taliban rule collapsed the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Kabul was established, formally attached to the embassy in Islamabad and consequently with a charge'd affairs. In 2004 the embassy was upgraded due to the establishment of the Embassy of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in Oslo. The Afghan embassy in Oslo is responsible for the entire Scandinavia, and accordingly non-resident to Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Iceland. The Norwegian embassy in Kabul had regular contact both with the Norwegian humanitarian environment and with CIMIC personnel. They arranged meetings once a month where two from each NGO were invited to join, in addition to the armed forces. On those monthly meetings the embassy's security-assessments were presented.<sup>56</sup>

As of 2004 Norway has also been participating with a police contingent to Afghanistan. The contingent consists of as up to ten police officers, and is part of Civilian Police, CivPol. The police officers participate in a German-lead training-project at the police school in Kabul.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> Interview 16 June, 2005

<sup>57</sup> The reader is referred to [www.politi.no](http://www.politi.no)

#### **4.6.3.1 UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, UNAMA**

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, UNAMA, was established on 28 March 2002, by UNSC resolution 1401.<sup>58</sup> UNAMA was established to integrate the activities of the UN agencies operating in Afghanistan. UNAMA's mandate is to promote national reconciliation, to implement the UN responsibilities stated in the Bonn Agreement, and to manage all UN humanitarian, relief, recovery and reconstruction activities in Afghanistan. It is led by the SRSG, whose authority over the planning and conduct of all UN activities in Afghanistan is reaffirmed in resolution 1401. Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi was appointed as SRSG for Afghanistan on 3 October 2001. Brahimi ended his tenure as SRSG in 2004. He was succeeded by Jean Arnault.<sup>59</sup>

#### **4.7 Norwegian CIMIC in Afghanistan**

Countries report possible force contributions to NATO's force register. On NATO Manning Conferences nations bid on which force contributions they wish to contribute with to a particular military operation. From the end of the 1990s CIMIC was a prioritised area, and the MoD perceived it as favourable to use that capacity. Hence an informal offer was given to NATO, which was accepted in the autumn of 2002. The MoD was responsible for identifying and assigning the CIMIC-contribution to ISAF, in addition to the superior CIMIC policy and the dialogue with the MFA on CIMIC projects. The MoD in collaboration with MFA developed policy for co-function between civilian and military efforts in conflict areas. The Norwegian Defence Staff and the National Joint

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<sup>58</sup> S/RES/1401 (2002)

<sup>59</sup> United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan: About UNAMA (read 25 March, 2004): <http://www.unama-afg.org/about/index.html>

Headquarters (FOHK) were responsible for the implementation of CIMIC in Afghanistan. MFA provided financing and project-approval during the CIMIC deployment.<sup>60</sup>

During the one-year period of the Norwegian CIMIC-deployment several countries committed CIMIC contributions to ISAF. Finland and Sweden were the greatest contributors, with six teams each. Norway and Germany had two teams, the British one team and in addition Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Turkey deployed CIMIC teams during the one-year period<sup>61</sup>. Furthermore many contingencies had CIMIC integrated as part of their force, then usually liaison-officers or CIMIC-officers.

Norwegian CIMIC had three rotations, and accordingly each element was deployed for a period of four months. Each element consisted of two CIMIC teams with six persons in each team, in addition to a commanding officer and an administration officer. Half of the officers were regular army professionals, whilst the rest were reserve-officers with civilian occupations. CIMIC element one and two had female officers, whilst element three did not. The Norwegian CIMIC teams lived in the engineer camp of ISAF Kabul Multinational Brigade (KMB), Camp Framheim. Other Norwegian force contributions stayed in the same camp before, during and after the CIMIC deployment.

The Norwegian CIMIC teams were responsible for two districts in the north-western part of Kabul, Mir Bacha Kot and Shakadara. Mir Bacha Kot had approximately 100 000 inhabitants, whilst Shakadara had approximately 140 000. The front line between the Taliban regime and the Northern Alliance had gone through these districts, causing massive destructions (Løvhaug2004). During the Soviet occupation in the 1980's the Shomali plain<sup>62</sup> was a free target range for the Soviet Air Force, and the roads between Baghram Airport and Kabul was regularly attacked by mujahedin guerrillas. The age old

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<sup>60</sup> This section is based on interview 20 May, 2005 and e-mail correspondence with MoD official 13 May, 2005 and 20 July, 2005

<sup>61</sup> Interview 6 April, 2005

<sup>62</sup> The Shomali plain is a plateau north of Kabul, which was an enormous battleground during decades of war. The district Mir Bacha Kot is part of this plateau.

“qanat” underground water reservoirs were used as arms caches and refuge for the guerrillas, and the destruction of this infrastructure had caused a severe setback for agriculture in these districts. The physical infrastructure was mirrored by the social organization which was also in tatters, and the setback for transferring inherent traditional knowledge was severe. A local boycott of the communist curriculum had caused the destruction of village schools by authorities, and a reciprocal guerrilla bombing campaign against schools teaching the loyalist/regime agenda. These tactics resulted in the area having no primary schooling facilities for almost two decades, making water and education obvious priorities to restore civil society.<sup>63</sup> Geographically the districts were not extensive, but the density of people was high as there often lived ten people in every house. Mir Bacha Kot had approximately 30 villages, Shakadara about 40, and each of these had a “malik”, a local village-chief.<sup>64</sup>

A “regular day” for the Norwegian CIMIC teams, to the degree that such a day in fact existed, would start with a morning brief on what task was to be carried out during the day. Then the teams would drive to the villages, usually with no appointment in advance due to security concerns. They would contact the district governors, civilian administrations or a “malik” with a needs-assessment interview form covering the water situation, health, education, nutrition, electricity and so on. According to the officers there was a lot of contact with civilians, and it took quite some time to cover all the villages. The CIMIC teams also talked with people in the streets, and handed out the ISAF-newspaper. When returning to camp patrol reports were made. The purpose was to form a correct and total picture of the situation in the districts and to map the local needs. The reports were delivered to the CIMIC Coordination Centre (CCC). Consequently the CCC would be able to assess where the needs were greatest.

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<sup>63</sup> Elaborated by CIMIC officer in e-mail 11 October, 2005

<sup>64</sup> Interview 6 April, 2005

After a period of time the Norwegian CIMIC teams were increasingly preoccupied with projects. The projects were financed by the budget for humanitarian activities in the MFA, from which the Norwegian CIMIC had been granted five million NOK. All projects needed approval from the MFA. In reality this meant approval from the embassy in Kabul, which received all project proposals and cost calculations. The embassy would send it to MFA, but usually, if the project was approved by the embassy, it would also be approved by the MFA. The embassy diplomat<sup>65</sup> stated that what happened at the MFA was a formality, and that the MFA followed the embassy's recommendations in all cases to his recollection. 90 percent of the project applications were smoothly approved, whilst with the last ten percent CIMIC was asked to revise the application, or it was recommended by the embassy with certain comments/recommendations. The MoD and the MFA had drawn up some criteria on which projects were to be launched. Amongst these were school, education, health and small infrastructure-programmes. Approval implied that the project was thematically placed within this frame. When a project had been approved a regular bidding was initiated, where entrepreneur firms were invited to give estimates. CCC would function as a project organization making the specifications, deals, contracts etc., and then it was mostly the CIMIC teams who followed up on the projects. It was a demand that if unskilled labour was to be used, the local villages would benefit by providing labour.

During the one-year period the Norwegian CIMIC unit carried out a number of projects, such as the building of five schools, establishing medical clinics and female dressmaker workshops, donations of school material and medical supplies, building wells and restoring qanat water arteries, establishing a patient-shuttle from the villages to the Norwegian and Dutch surgical hospital units in Kabul, water supplies and vaccinating cattle. One CIMIC officer emphasised that the village population's possibility to have water for their farmland was of immediate vital concern, in order to sustain further refugee return. Drought, erosion, and the influential social strata's deep drilling for water

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<sup>65</sup> Interview 16 June, 2005

were counterproductive in this respect. However, the restoration of the qanat system was work intensive as opposed to the capital intensive deep drilling. The hand on approach of CIMIC was of importance to attain local sentiment in regard to i.e. certain ethnic groups being prioritized by the local powers.<sup>66</sup>

A Norwegian CIMIC element was among 18 elements belonging to the CIMIC Coordination Centre and Finnish-lead CJ9 structure.<sup>67</sup> Liaison-officers (LNOs) integrated into national contingencies were commanded by CJ9, but did not necessarily report to the CCC. Germany, Italy and the U.K. were disentangled from this structure, and not coordinated by the ISAF system. This created major problems for the CJ9 and CCC structure. One CIMIC-officer labelled the German, Italian and British CIMIC “national CIMIC” elements, and hints to them being very close to “military NGOs.”<sup>68</sup> The 18 ISAF CIMIC elements had meetings in the CCC every day, whilst the “national CIMIC” elements were invited to weekly meetings where participation was voluntary.

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<sup>66</sup> Elaborated by CIMIC officer in e-mail 11 October, 2005

<sup>67</sup> Combined Joint 9: Head of the branch within a military staff responsible for handling civil/military matters and being the Military Commanders adviser in these matters (CIMIC-officer in e-mail correspondence 23 October, 2005)

<sup>68</sup> Interview 23 August, 2005

## **Part 4: Analysis**

### **5. Prior to deployment: The Norwegian decision to contribute with a civil-military cooperation unit to Afghanistan**

#### ***5.1 The impact of rational and strategic imperatives***

To investigate the Norwegian decision to contribute with a CIMIC unit to Afghanistan in a rationalist light I will discuss how national security-policy interests at the political-strategic level and the central military-strategic objectives identified in the methodological chapter influenced the decision. The hypothesis claims that *H 1: To contribute with a civil-military cooperation unit to Afghanistan was a rational course of action maximizing Norwegian security-policy interests and military-strategic objectives.*

##### **5.1.1 The political-strategic level**

In the methodological chapter I suggested that two Norwegian security-policy interests would influence the decision to contribute with a CIMIC unit to Afghanistan. The first interest was to secure continued NATO relevance, which is a stated Norwegian goal and essential to Norwegian security. Frantzen (2005:3) claims that “To what extent national policy adapts to Alliance policy is in part dependent on the power relations within the Alliance.” The small state status of Norway and the desire to secure the relevance of NATO makes Norway more receptive to Alliance policy. NATO has accelerated its focus on CIMIC since the Balkan-wars, and consequently it would be rational for Norway to do the same. When NATO requested that national CIMIC units be established, Norway acted upon the request. One CIMIC-officer suggested that one reason for deciding to contribute



with a CIMIC unit was to secure “...integration into NATO...”<sup>69</sup> The clear intent that NATO CIMIC is Norwegian CIMIC also underscores this. A MoD official stressed that Norway wish to make NATO a multinational instrument.<sup>70</sup> To secure NATO relevance would arguably be achieved by making any force contribution to a NATO operation. If it is possible to point to cases where Norway has turned down a NATO request for a force contribution to an operation, this would imply that other forces also are at play other than this strictly superior strategic one.

The second Norwegian security-policy interest would be to position Norway with a relevant niche-capacity. The development of niche-capacities should to some extent be based on capacities and competencies which the nations already for different reasons master well. For Norway it would be natural to focus on capacities where the armed forces have a high competence, and the maintenance of national tasks would require the same capacities (Styrke og relevans 2004, article 172). Civil-military cooperation is not mentioned in Styrke og relevans as a niche-capacity. Yet it is by many perceived as such, and Prime Minister Bondevik stated on an occasion that “Norway is good on civil-military cooperation” (cited in Eide 2003). A CIMIC-officer suggested the same, stating that Norway decided to contribute with CIMIC to “... maintain a Norwegian profile internationally, which suggests that we are relatively good on CIMIC, and that other nations perceive us as specialists.”<sup>71</sup>

When asking the interviewees why we decided to contribute with CIMIC most of them had a more narrow approach to the answer than a political-strategic angle of incidence. This might have been due to the framing of the question. Still, I do not believe that the lack of informants pointing to these interests discard them. Stated policy suggests that they are highly relevant to the decision to contribute with CIMIC. Arguably NATO relevance would be better secured with a force contribution on the sharp end of the

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<sup>69</sup> Interview 1 June, 2005

<sup>70</sup> Interview 20 May, 2005

<sup>71</sup> Interview 1 June, 2005

military spectre, such as the F-16 Air Force unit contribution to Afghanistan which was also a very visible contribution. Perhaps this could be compensated for by the suggested niche-capacity quality of CIMIC.

## **5.1.2 The military-strategic level**

### **5.1.2.1 CIMIC Group North, cost-effectiveness and experience**

I identified five military-strategic objectives which might have an impact on the decision to contribute with CIMIC in the methodological chapter. In this section I will elaborate on three of them. First it must be noted that the political-strategic and military-strategic levels are intertwined and the separation may seem a bit artificial. I choose to uphold the distinction in order to separate the superior political variables from the ones more military in nature. One CIMIC-officer claimed the following:

“We contribute with CIMIC now because we are in the establishing-phase of CIMIC Group North, and it was a wish, a request to these different countries to contribute with CIMIC. We had the possibility to make that contribution, and it was a relevant force contribution at that time. We were supposed to participate, but did not have the capacity to have a greater engagement, as we had an entire battalion in Kosovo, but it was a little but visible contribution.”<sup>72</sup>

Another CIMIC-officer underlined that Norway wish to be a supplier of premises to doctrinal developments, both in CIMIC Group North and in the general development of doctrines for peacekeeping operations in the UN. Involvement in doctrinal work fosters participation, and this underlies the CIMIC effort according to the officer.<sup>73</sup> The MoD official supports this notion, stating that “The AJP-9 has gained Norwegian approval. We

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<sup>72</sup> Interview 6 April, 2005

<sup>73</sup> Interview 1 June, 2005

were party to the making and are content with the result.”<sup>74</sup> The CIMIC-officer continued to state that:

“Norway contributes with CIMIC because it is cost-effective. We can send out a force-contribution which displays the Norwegian flag, and in this manner satisfy the MFA. At the same time it does not put a heavy load on the officer corps, since CIMIC personnel are often recruited from civilian ranks. This does not cost the MoD too much, and hence we attain a minimum common multiple when it comes to the needs of the MFA and MoD.”

The valuable experience of participating with CIMIC in Afghanistan was not emphasised by any of the interviewees. Despite this I will argue that any desire to develop CIMIC as a concept and Norwegian CIMIC policy would presuppose CIMIC experience. Accordingly experience will be relevant for the following discussions.

As showed, the participation in CGN and the cost-effectiveness of CIMIC were emphasised by CIMIC-officers as vital to the decision to contribute with CIMIC. Some points made by the SSO complicate this picture. Norwegian participation in HQ CGN was suggested terminated. The motive for suggesting termination had to do with economic considerations, as it costs around five million NOK per year to participate in HQ CGN. Yet the reasons for continued participation were several according to the officer. CIMIC as such is very cost-effective both to obtain and run, and is positively received by the public opinion. The CIMIC elements were trained in HQ CGN before deployment to Afghanistan, and the North Sea Strategy Countries<sup>75</sup> are participating, except for the U.K. Further on it would be politically unfortunate to terminate the Norwegian participation in an organization working within a field which is often emphasised by the Prime Minister

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<sup>74</sup> Interview 20 May, 2005

<sup>75</sup> The North Sea Strategy is a Norwegian initiative, giving Norway access to military capacities through multinational cooperation. The strategy is directed towards multinational defence-political cooperation with the U.K., Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands, which are suitable strategic partners for Norway. Read more in Whitepaper 42 (2003-2004, article 3.6.7)

as being of great concern to Norway. In fact the Chief of Defence Norway (CHODN)<sup>76</sup> decided that Norway should participate in the establishment of CGN due to the fact that CIMIC is something positive, easily visible and relatively cheap.<sup>77</sup>

Participation in CGN and the cost-effectiveness of CIMIC seem to be highly relevant to the decision to contribute with a CIMIC unit.

#### **5.1.2.2 CIMIC as a concept**

The MoD official stated that “It was desirable for Norway to contribute with a CIMIC unit to Afghanistan in order to test CIMIC as a concept”, and continued to stress that “previously, such as in the Balkans, CIMIC has been a more integrated part of a greater Norwegian force-contribution.”<sup>78</sup> Lack of extensive experience combined with conceptual confusion called for testing CIMIC as a concept. The PSO in Afghanistan provided an opportunity to translate the idea of specific CIMIC elements into practice. “Does everybody understand what CIMIC really is?” asked one of the CIMIC-officers rhetorically.<sup>79</sup> The answer would seem to be “no”. Another CIMIC-officer stated that “many perceive CIMIC as a military NGO, both civilians and actually also military personnel. Still there are great misconceptions as to what CIMIC really is.”<sup>80</sup> In the NUPI KFOR V database one officer claims that “Everything is CIMIC. This entire operation is more or less CIMIC.”<sup>81</sup> This all-embracing understanding of CIMIC conflicts with the “conservative” CIMIC-approach preferred by states such as the U.S. and Germany presented in the introduction of this thesis, whilst it seems to fit the British approach in Kosovo. One of the Norwegian CIMIC-officers understands CIMIC as follows:

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<sup>76</sup> Forsvarssjefen (FSJ), Sigurd Frisvold 1999-2005

<sup>77</sup> Interview 23 September, 2005

<sup>78</sup> Interview 20 May, 2005

<sup>79</sup> Interview 13 May, 2005

<sup>80</sup> Interview 6 April, 2005

<sup>81</sup> NUPI database on KFOR V

“There are different understandings of what CIMIC is really about. My understanding, based on the NATO doctrine taught us prior to deployment, is that CIMIC activities should focus on obtaining information about the humanitarian situation in the area of operation. The object is to ensure that the Commander has knowledge of the humanitarian situation as part of the information used to assess the actions needed to reach the objective of the mission. If the Commander is of the opinion that use of military resources should be utilized in relation to humanitarian aid/projects, e.g. because the security situation does not allow IOs/NGOs to take care of such measures, this is also CIMIC.”<sup>82</sup>

This perception of CIMIC also seems to clash with the “everything is CIMIC” understanding. Seemingly, CIMIC was deployed to Afghanistan without a full understanding of what was meant by it. Apparently relevant parties were conscious to this lack of understanding, and consequently the effort to “test the concept” by means of deploying a CIMIC unit to Afghanistan would be a rational step.

### **5.1.2.3 A Norwegian CIMIC-policy**

Greve and Hertzeberg (2001:11) remark on a growing interest for CIMIC in Norway due to the participation in CGN and the establishment of the CIMIC-standby force. In a memo to the NUPI database on KFOR V, some lessons and points of concern for the Norwegian military regarding CIMIC are mentioned. The memo states that hardly any of the Norwegian officers working with CIMIC did have any experience in the area prior to deployment, and that this must be considered natural as CIMIC was a new area to the Norwegian military. Further on the lack of guidelines was thought to seriously disrupt the efficiency of CIMIC, and there was an expressed need to increase the understanding of the concept.

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<sup>82</sup> Interview 9 May, 2005

There are still no Norwegian CIMIC handbooks, but according to one CIMIC-officer “...it has been our goal to develop guidelines, but due to several factors such as loss of personnel to other jobs and the fact that we have been much out, it has not happened yet. But when Norwegian CIMIC guidelines are made they will be based on NATO CIMIC.”<sup>83</sup> There is a growing awareness of the importance of CIMIC also in training. One CIMIC-officer emphasised that the NATO exercise Battle Griffin in the winter of 2004 was the first exercise in Norway with the participation of specific CIMIC teams.<sup>84</sup>

According to a CIMIC-officer institutional learning is secured by means of writing reports and the readiness force. Previously the Norwegian Defence International Centre (NODEFIC)<sup>85</sup> had a lessons learned database, but it has been moved to the section in National Joint Headquarters (FOHK)<sup>86</sup> responsible for training and lessons learned. At FOHK they have developed a database called Ferdaball.<sup>87</sup> NODEFIC was closed down in July 2005, and the remaining tasks transferred to the Norwegian Defence College (NODC).<sup>88</sup>

Sources suggest that the Norwegian CIMIC policy was in a fumble-phase at the end of the 1990s. Consequent developments gave the Norwegian CIMIC policy a direction, but still there is a way to go, particularly considering the lack of written material and the need for new CIMIC-structures to consolidate. The embassy diplomat called for further inquiries into the concept, stating that:

“The embassy was not in the picture until a few days before deployment. I have expressed some wondering. Why CIMIC? The embassy was not asked for advice. Everything happened very fast.

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<sup>83</sup> Interview 6 April, 2005

<sup>84</sup> Interview 6 April, 2005. Battle Griffin was arranged in Nord-Trøndelag February 21 to March 11. 14 000 soldiers from 15 countries participated. The purpose of the field exercise was to train Norwegian and allied units and the NATO Response Force (NRF) in conflict management during winter-conditions. Source: [http://www.mil.no/foi/ldks/start/\\_velser\\_LDKS\\_inter/\\_Battle\\_Griffin\\_5005/](http://www.mil.no/foi/ldks/start/_velser_LDKS_inter/_Battle_Griffin_5005/)

<sup>85</sup> Forsvarets Kompetansesenter for Internasjonal Virksomhet (FOKIV)

<sup>86</sup> Fellesoperativt Hovedkvarter (FOHK)

<sup>87</sup> Interview 6 April, 2005

<sup>88</sup> Forsvarets Skolesenter (FSS)

It seems to me that the less you involved the embassy, the easier things could get going. My hope is that the armed forces use more time to discuss different aspects with this concept, and that the MoD becomes more sensitive to contributions to the discussion.”<sup>89</sup>

One MFA official also hints to the need for a more thorough decision-making process before deploying CIMIC: “The decision to contribute with CIMIC to Afghanistan was neither a proposal nor a decision made at the MFA. The armed forces and the MoD asked for funding of the CIMIC-projects after the decision had been made to contribute with a CIMIC-unit.”<sup>90</sup>

Evidently the Norwegian CIMIC policy is developing. The decision to contribute with CIMIC will stimulate this process. Among the CIMIC-officers there seem to be a greater focus on the fact that Norwegian CIMIC is NATO CIMIC, than the perception of a Norwegian CIMIC-policy as such. It seems that the development of a Norwegian CIMIC-policy was a natural effect of the decision to contribute with CIMIC, but I have not established that it was a stated objective.

## **5.2 The impact of culturalism**

To investigate the impact of culturalism as developed by Elizabeth Kier I must first elaborate on the Norwegian political culture and the Norwegian military organizational culture. I will adapt the procedure of Kier presented in the methodological chapter, keeping in mind that these concepts are wide in their scope, their definitions are contested and manners of measurement are manifold. My effort will be to elaborate on specifics of the cultures which are relevant to my thesis, not attempting to present the whole picture. The hypothesis claims that: *H 2: To contribute with a civil-military cooperation unit to*

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<sup>89</sup> Interview 16 June, 2005

<sup>90</sup> Interview 3 June, 2005

*Afghanistan was a Norwegian interest defined by Norwegian political and military organizational culture.*

### **5.2.1 CIMIC as a national interests defined by political and military organizational culture**

The development of certain military capacities need not necessarily be rational. Kier has shown how the choice of an offensive or defensive doctrine in France and Great Britain between the World Wars was not a result of rational imperatives or international constraints, but rather a consequence of the interaction between the domestic political culture and the military organizational culture. In this section I will discuss how indicators from the Norwegian political and military organizational cultures might have had an impact on the decision to contribute with a CIMIC unit to Afghanistan.

Ulriksen (2002:246) claims that the Norwegian perception of war and peace is as follows: there is only war if there is war in Norway. And even if Norway commits forces to war abroad, there is still peace. The perception of war and peace is tied to the Norwegian territory, as a legacy of the defence tradition of 1905. Ulriksen (2002:249) continues to state that “In Norway it is quite all right to say that the armed forces are not suited for combat missions and that the soldiers can not fight. This does not even lead somebody to start teach them this, it is rather how it is suppose to be.” A great inquiry of the armed forces in 2003 showed that 79 % of the population approved of Norwegian participation in international military missions. Evidently the public accepted relatively great changes to the function and role of the army, with a stronger international focus and emphasis on peacekeeping missions. Yet, the public was positive to peacekeeping missions and far more reluctant to using Norwegian forces in combat internationally (Strømsod et al. 2004).



It is politically costly to go to war when such perceptions prevail. This might explain why Prime Minister Bondevik needed two years to admit that Norway as a nation actually was at war in Kosovo. During a question-session in FOHK at Jåtta Prime Minister Bondevik had to admit that Norwegian F-16 pilots had been at war in Kosovo in 1999. He was asked whether he understood that the pilots reacted on his definition of the F-16 mission in Kosovo as “not-war”. The Prime Minister replied:

“...as a politician at that time I should have cut through all the juridical and international law considerations, and parallels with other wars in other parts of the world, and said yes, this is a war. We are sending Norwegian pilots into a war. So this I have learned” (Eide 2003).

Participating in international military operations did not promote an officer or soldier’s military career historically speaking. Despite the fact that Norway was known to be a great contributor to UN peacekeeping missions during the Cold War, this participation was considered a bi-activity to military personnel. Findlay (1996:7) suggests that “old peacekeepers” like Norway regarded participation in peacekeeping as “the quintessence of good international citizenship.” But it was not regarded as the quintessence of military professionalism at home. During the 1990s this line of thinking was challenged. A generation of officers with experience from complex, multinational military missions replaced the “Cold War Warrior” generation. Today the picture has changed, and a professional military career is almost inconceivable if the soldier or officer lack experience from international operations. Yet, the degree of positive valuation may vary. On the question of whether CIMIC is “accepted” by the more traditional military branches, one officer replies “No, I will not say that. CIMIC is perceived as an “out-group”, an alternative, opportunistic career path, and not real military work, but rather a politically correct matter which smells a bit. I disagree with such an attitude. Military operations are helpless without CIMIC.”<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>91</sup> Interview 1 June, 2005

One final point on the previously required connection between Norwegian territory and military events of significance has to do with the well-established Norwegian conception of a “people’s defence” and the total-defence concept. Despite the fact that CIMIC as a force contribution and civil-military cooperation in a total-defence context must not be confused as mentioned before, I will still suggest that the strong legacy of a total-defence concept where all components of society are intended to interact in order to meet a crisis makes the CIMIC concept and experience more relevant and topical.

Ulriksen (2002:19) argues that the Norwegian armed forces for almost two hundred years, and specially the last hundred, have been designed first and foremost to cover other needs than the purely military ones. Norwegian self-image is constituted of e.g. “peace nation” and “humanitarian great power” perceptions. “Civil-military cooperation sounds great” said one of my interviewees.<sup>92</sup> Why is that, one might wonder. Arguably it does not sound that good in all ears.

The need for humanitarian labels is a product of this tradition, and hence the focus on “humanitarian” force contributions, military personnel doing “humanitarian” work and so on. The purely military component is down-scaled. The knowledge of political communication is that war sells badly to the Norwegian audience. Even the armed forces emphasise the “humanitarian” aspects of their operations. The headlines on articles published in military magazines and on Forsvarsnett regarding the CIMIC mission hints to this, such as “The 52 good helpers” (Kvam 2002), “The start of humanitarian help in uniform” (Hjelseth 2003), “Friendly activities by Kabul” (Grut 2003), “A helping hand” (Løvhaug 2004) and “Ending the relief efforts” (Wangberg 2004)<sup>93</sup>. The Prime Minister was also asked if the labels “humanitarian officer” and “humanitarian focus” were necessary to obtain popular and political support to the use of the Norwegian armed forces in international operations. He answered:

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<sup>92</sup> Interview 22 September, 2005

<sup>93</sup> My translations of Norwegian web-articles

“I do not think it to be necessary to gain support, but I think it is desirable in order to increase the support... I believe that when some of the operations also have a humanitarian outlook, it is an advantage. We know that armed conflicts lead to destruction of civilian structures. I think it is important that Norway can contribute, both through voluntary organizations doing this kind of work, but also through the armed forces” (Eide 2003).

The discussion so forth touches on relevant aspects of the military organizational culture as well. It might be suggested that the motivations for military personnel to participate in international military missions have changed. Perhaps idealism and adventure were more prominent motivational aspects during the Cold War. Equally they may be more prominent when participating in a force contribution perceived as a bit un-military. Norwegian CIMIC prescribes a minimum use of force, and a great focus on consent. To some officers CIMIC aspires to a great degree of humanitarian efforts, whilst others emphasise that any efforts must be in support of the military mission. The humanitarian worker makes the following suggestion when it comes to the understandings of Norwegian military personnel in PSOs:

“Within the Norwegian armed forces a good institutional practice and a clear understanding has been developed that we are not going out to fight a war, we are going out to secure peace, and to make sure that the places we go to does not become less peaceful. We try to solve conflicts and to de-escalate them.”<sup>94</sup>

One CIMIC officer believed that the political authorities back home perceived the contribution as humanitarian aid by means of military personnel.<sup>95</sup> Evidently CIMIC is a force-contribution which is easily sold to the Norwegian public. It is certainly politically costly to go to war, but it would be less costly when attaching a “humanitarian” label to the military mission. CIMIC is a combat support function, and hence not dimensioned for

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<sup>94</sup> Interview 11 March, 2005

<sup>95</sup> Interview 9 May, 2005

combat missions. CIMIC is consistent with the kind of force contributions the Norwegian public positively embrace. The Norwegian political and military organizational culture seems to define CIMIC as an interest.

Yet what about the sharper end of the spectrum of military tools? According to Moldjord et al. (2003), Norwegian international military activities may increasingly be characterized as “sharp” operations. They mention that a simulated town is being built at Rena, where Norwegian soldiers are to be trained in fighting in built-up areas. They also mention the use of Norwegian Special Forces in direct combat-missions against the Taliban in Afghanistan, and how this officially is one of very few operations since the Second World War where Norwegian soldiers have participated in combat-operations. October 2001 Norway deployed six F-16 combat planes to Afghanistan. This was also the first time since the Second World War that Norwegian combat planes participated in bombardment missions abroad.<sup>96</sup> When the mission was completed at the end of March 2003, the Norwegian planes had been requested to assist coalition forces under fire and consequently dropped bombs against hostile positions three times.

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<sup>96</sup> Norway also deployed F-16 combat planes to Kosovo in 1999 as earlier mentioned, but at that time the Norwegian planes did not have the demanded air-to-surface capacity, in addition to some operative inadequacies in the darkness, and consequently could not be used in “sharp” attacks targeting positions on the ground.

## **6. During deployment: The Norwegian approach to civil-military cooperation in Afghanistan**

### ***6.1 The impact of military rationalism and national security-policy interests***

To investigate the Norwegian approach to CIMIC within a rationalist framework I will analyze how national security-policy interests influenced the approach. Further on I will analyze to what degree the Norwegian CIMIC unit acted in accordance with the NATO CIMIC doctrine on the tactical level. The hypothesis claims that: *H 3: The Norwegian approach to civil-military cooperation in Afghanistan was a rational military approach maximizing Norwegian security-policy interests.*

#### **6.1.1 The political-strategic level**

On the political-strategic level during deployment the national security interests discussed in section 5.1 was sought promoted by means of visibility. According to Heier (2005:4) Norway has limited political and military resources. Norway is not a member of the EU, and member of a NATO where decisions are increasingly settled in advance, between the great powers and between the EU-members. The NATO-US channel is put under pressure from a gradually more dynamic EU-U.S. channel. Consequently, according to Heier, the Norwegian fear of marginalization is real. Influence over our own security-policy interests demands participation in the international processes where decisions are being made. Military force contributions is a means to achieve this objective. To be able to make substantial contributions are important. I cannot prove that the decision to contribute with CIMIC gave Norway access to forums where decisions are made. But I will discuss how the force contribution was profiled in terms of visibility.

There seem to have been a common understanding in the Norwegian CIMIC elements of certain expectations linked to their deployment from the political authorities back home in Norway. According to one officer “The MFA most probably expected it, and the political authorities certainly expected that as we went down with CIMIC elements, we would do projects to put the Norwegian flag on display.”<sup>97</sup>

The MFA, via the embassy, acted as the relevant authority for the Norwegian CIMIC units. “The MoD did not wish to steer CIMIC”, claimed one officer, and continued to state that “political concession was granted to the MFA”. Seemingly, as the decision to contribute with CIMIC had been secured, the MoD had reached its primary objective, which according to the officer was “integration into NATO, and to secure a continuing role for Norway in ISAF.”<sup>98</sup> The source of the aspiration to project the Norwegian flag seems to be a bit disputed. My interviewees in the MFA were not pleased with the efforts to display the Norwegian flag on CIMIC projects. Their reasons were several. According to them it was not necessarily desirable that everybody should know where the money came from, it sufficed that the Norwegian contribution was noted in the statistics. Further on the local attachment to the projects should be in focus, and the Afghan flag should be on the projects. One CIMIC-officer suggested that ideally the ISAF flag should be on the projects, and consequently that whoever carried out the projects were not of the essence.<sup>99</sup>

Tvedt (2003:70) points to how the differences in values and discourse of the Norwegian relief system on the one hand and the traditional foreign policy branch on the other may cause problems. He exemplifies his claim by discussing a suggestion made in the middle of the 1980s to have some small Norwegian flags on tents financed by Norway through the budgets of relief-organizations. The reply at that time was rejection; the organizations were in Ethiopia to help, not to promote Norway. In the middle of the 1990s the same tents were back in Ethiopia, and the suggestion was made again that small flags should be

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<sup>97</sup> Interview 9 May, 2005

<sup>98</sup> Interview 1 June, 2005

<sup>99</sup> Interview 9 May, 2005

on the tents. This time the Norwegian MFA had other ideas; Norway should be flagged and given a high profile, and big Norwegian flags were put on the tents. The “bridge-building suggestion” of small flags lost both times. The differences between the relief branch and the foreign policy branch are arguably present within the MFA today, and might explain why the CIMIC officers understood it to be a MFA expectation that Norwegian flags be put on display, whilst the MFA officials with whom I have spoken, did not wish to project the Norwegian flag on CIMIC projects.<sup>100</sup> Yet the MFA did contribute to the promotion of the projects through the presence of the charge d’affaires to “lend some lustre” by e.g. inaugurating schools. The embassy diplomat stated that:

“We wanted to flag lower. The MoD wanted to forward this. Actually you should believe that the armed forces would prefer a lower profile than the MFA, but in this case it was the other way around. In my opinion it was overexposed. Had the Minister of International Development seen the Norwegian flag on the post outside the school when she came on a visit, she would not have been pleased.”<sup>101</sup>

Apparently, one part of the national agenda of Norway was accomplished as we contributed with CIMIC as such. Another part was to be accomplished by means of using the Norwegian flag. One officer claimed that “I am possibly naïve, but I will claim that Norway did not have a national agenda. But, of course, by using the Norwegian flag, then we did, we could have chosen to do ISAF-projects and down scale the national, but then again no one did that.”<sup>102</sup> The perception of Norway as a country lacking a national agenda is in line with several statements in the NUPI database on KFOR as well, such as the statement of this officer “We are perceived as a country with a little or no national agenda, and we are edible to the great powers.”<sup>103</sup> The humanitarian informant also supports this, stating that “Norway is not a great-political player, and is consequently able

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<sup>100</sup> The suggested dividing line between the relief branch and the foreign policy branch in the MFA may seem a bit black and white. Certainly the division is more complex, and the organizations may have developed more crossing dividing lines. The picture is more complicated than described, but arguably still relevant.

<sup>101</sup> Interview 16 June, 2005

<sup>102</sup> Interview 6 April, 2005

<sup>103</sup> NUPI database on KFOR V

to operate very freely, and that is an advantage. I believe that is why Norwegian CIMIC has been well-liked by the national populations the places where I have met them.”<sup>104</sup>

Several interviewees in the NUPI database on KFOR underline the important and positive effects of showing national flags. One officer claims that “It has a great effect to show flags. It demonstrates that KFOR is multinational and that the nation supports the mission,”<sup>105</sup> and another that “Everybody agree that showing different flags is a good thing. It shows unity of effort.”<sup>106</sup>

Seemingly it is not plausible to detach the CIMIC-contributions from a national agenda. But the national agendas of different nations vary a great deal, influenced by other commitments in the operational theatre, commercial interests, national interests and so on. In this respect financing and agendas will be closely linked. On the question of whether national agendas influenced CIMIC, one officer answered “Definitely, the EU financed Sweden and Finland, the EU does not grant money without a note, and neither does Norway.”<sup>107</sup> According to this officer the fact that the MFA had to approve every project pointed to strong national control. One nation which clearly used their CIMIC capacity to support a national agenda seems to have been the Germans. One CIMIC-officer said “The Germans were in charge of the police, they were mandated to rebuild the police in Afghanistan. This does not necessarily go hand in hand with the military mission.”<sup>108</sup> The Germans have mixed CIMIC work with a national agenda also previously, in Kosovo: “A German unit... has built 12000 – 13000 houses. In that lie national interests: they want to get people out of Germany.”<sup>109</sup>

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<sup>104</sup> Interview 11 March, 2005

<sup>105</sup> NUPI database on KFOR V

<sup>106</sup> NUPI database on KFOR V

<sup>107</sup> Interview 1 June, 2005

<sup>108</sup> Interview 6 April, 2005

<sup>109</sup> NUPI database on KFOR V – the “people” the Germans wanted to expel was Kosovar Albanians refugees



As mentioned before the Norwegian CIMIC contribution was financed from the humanitarian budget in the MFA. According to Rollins (2001:127):

“...the vast majority of funding for CIMIC activities comes from national sources channelled through national contingents. This is a fact of life and there need be nothing wrong with it *per se* – provided that such action does not compromise either the NATO theatre-level plan or – by extension – activities carried out by civilian organizations.”

One MFA official stated that the financing of projects made by military units to gain force protection should be financed by the MoD, and not over the humanitarian budget. The official continued to state that this viewpoint was common quite far up in the MFA hierarchy.<sup>110</sup> The notion of MoD financing is supported by a CIMIC officer stating that “MoD financing would have made things easier.”<sup>111</sup>

One CIMIC officer stated that “In my opinion NATO funds should have been at the disposal of the force commander.”<sup>112</sup> Another officer commented that it was a little original to have national funds, by some perceived as “oilmoney” in the Norwegian case. Sweden and Finland arguably found themselves on unequal terms, having to apply to Brussels. This officer found that the funding of the Norwegian CIMIC lead to an increased dynamic, by virtue of an increased possibility for activity, and was an advantage relationally as the Afghans understood the Norwegian capability of getting things done fast. Perceivably this was good from the perspective of the Norwegians, but might be a problem from the perspective of the entire operation, as it lead to “... a distortion within the area of operations.”<sup>113</sup> According to one CIMIC-officer:

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<sup>110</sup> Interview 3 June, 2005

<sup>111</sup> Interview 23 August, 2005. The price for the Norwegian officers in Iraq during the first half of 2003 was 99.6 million NOK, of which 57 million NOK was from the humanitarian budget in the MFA. According to Stene (2005: 10) intense debates followed in the wake of this funding. In 2004 all expenses were covered by the defence-budget.

<sup>112</sup> Interview 6 April, 2005

<sup>113</sup> Interview 1 June, 2005

“Ideally the CCC should be able to identify the needs, and insert resources based on these assessments. But this is not how it worked in practice. Every nation provides their contingent with a budget. We were financed by the MFA, and had spacious frames for action compared to others. From an isolated point of view this is unfortunate because certain areas may be favoured with more support, even though these areas originally are better off than others”<sup>114</sup>

One officer warns against the “Santa-Clause syndrome,” where the content feeling of having done something good to somebody blinds you to the fact that people are worse off just around the corner.<sup>115</sup> According to another CIMIC officer:

“You go in, and you create expectations, and you do something within one district which others can not do in another, and this may create conflicts, but I am uncertain whether these conflicts have greater repercussions on solving the military mission than the positive effects actually created.”<sup>116</sup>

This problem is not unique to Afghanistan. One of the officers in the NUPI database on KFOR stated that:

“People in Kosovo get one or the other KFOR nation to their area in order to create a “Safe and Secure Environment”. Some get Norwegians, others Spaniards. Certainly the tasks are not dealt with in the same manner in the different areas... despite the differences it is important to try to standardize. The force as a whole should act as unified as possible, sending one signal.”<sup>117</sup>

Norwegian CIMIC was a visible contribution. The execution of a great number of projects funded by the MFA increased the visibility. Despite the divergent perspectives on the degree of “flagging” no non-flag or bridge-building suggestions prevailed. National

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<sup>114</sup> Interview 9 May, 2005

<sup>115</sup> Interview 23 August, 2005

<sup>116</sup> Interview 6 April, 2005

<sup>117</sup> NUPI database on KFOR V

financing combined with the possibility to focus on the Norwegian areas of responsibility, created synergy-effects.

## **6.1.2 The tactical level**

### **6.1.2.1 Civil-military liaison**

Civil-military liaison aims at the creation of necessary coordination with civilian bodies. The establishment, promotion and maintenance of coordination are perceived as a pre-condition for the other two core CIMIC functions. Liaison is also intended to obtain the support of the population, IOs and NGOs (AJP-9, article 104-a). The fact that there are not waterproof bulkheads between the three CIMIC core functions was stressed by a CIMIC-officer. He illustrated this point as follows:

“Broadly speaking we spend 50 percent of our time on support to the civil society, 30 percent on liaison, 20 percent on support to the force, and much of this was liaison, at the same time support to the civilian society and liaison may be perceived as 80 percent.”<sup>118</sup>

Another CIMIC-officer supports this point. According to him what the Norwegian CIMIC units in Afghanistan did the most, was support to the civil society. But as the CIMIC units travelled around and collected data on the state of affairs in their districts, they developed an understanding of what happened and how the situation was in that particular area, and hence this activity would simultaneously be support to the force.<sup>119</sup> Accordingly the three core functions are closely intertwined, and certain activities may carry multiple labels. Support to the civil environment may also be liaison and support to the force at the same time. It is noteworthy that what is intended to be the most important core function, liaison, was the least emphasised and elaborated by the CIMIC-officers. This might be due to the fact that liaison, as stated above, is very much integrated into the other core functions. It

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<sup>118</sup> Interview 1 June, 2005

<sup>119</sup> Interview 6 April, 2005

might also be the case that the coordination mechanisms are established first and foremost in the early stages of the deployment, and that the consequent units are adopting established procedures and focusing more on other tasks.

According to one CIMIC-officer, it was of the essence to find out which NGOs were operating in the area, and then start relation-building. At the same time it was important to pinpoint local power players, IOs and NGOs and to establish formal contacts. By means of contact the actors would avoid duplication of work and secure the spreading of resources in the shared area of responsibility.<sup>120</sup> The relationship between the CIMIC-elements and the other actors are seemingly not perceived as black or white, but with many shades of grey, ranging from informal to formal with a constant focus on relation-building. As will be seen later this picture is supported by the humanitarian informant.

#### **6.1.3.2 Support to the civil environment**

Support to the civil environment refers to the interaction with civilian bodies, and covers a wide spectrum of activities. AJP-9 article 104-b lists a wide range of conceivable military support, such as information, material, equipment, training, communications and transport facilities.

We have already seen how one of the CIMIC-officers pointed to support to the civil environment as the most time-consuming core function. The CIMIC teams had daily contact with representatives of the local authorities in different villages, visiting district governors and the district administrations. They had meetings with the maliks in the villages, in addition to the weekly malik-meetings with the governor. The CIMIC teams talked with people in the streets, and handed out the ISAF-newspaper.

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<sup>120</sup> Interview 13 May, 2005

In the two districts the Norwegian CIMIC teams operated there was a low presence of humanitarian organizations. The reason why is unknown, though part of the explanation may be that the area was not prioritized by the humanitarian community. The humanitarian worker hints to this by stating:

“The CIMIC function was localized in Kabul. There are certain needs in the Kabul-area, but the real needs are out on the countryside, and not in Kabul. Hence, from a development-perspective and a humanitarian perspective we do not think that money should be granted to those operating within Kabul, but rather to those operating outside the capital.”<sup>121</sup>

Some hotly debated issues with the military CIMIC function has to do with the relationship between the military and the humanitarian actors. In this section some of these issues will be elaborated as they are vital to the whole context of civil-military cooperation.

Two NGOs did operate in the two Norwegian districts, and those were the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA) and ACTED.<sup>122</sup> Seemingly the Norwegian CIMIC-officers did not encounter any particular problems or reluctance when cooperating with these humanitarian organizations on the ground. According to one officer “We had an ok relationship with them. On the tactical ground level, I did not experience any particular difficulties when cooperating with humanitarian organizations.”<sup>123</sup> The Swedish Committee for Afghanistan had been in the country for a long time, and according to an officer efforts were made to draw on SCA background expertise for project implementation followed by common profiling when the project was finalized. The officer did not know the success of these efforts due to rotation, but remarks on the willingness of the SCA to be part of such an arrangement.<sup>124</sup>

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<sup>121</sup> Interview 11 March, 2005

<sup>122</sup> Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (Agence d’aide à la coopération technique et au développement)

<sup>123</sup> Interview 6 April, 2005

<sup>124</sup> Interview 9 May, 2005

The humanitarian informant points to one source of frustration, due to the frequent rotation of CIMIC elements. Every time a new CIMIC element arrives people come in search for information, and this could be tiresome to the busy humanitarians. The humanitarian worker issues a need for institutional memory in the rotational-process, and also a need for better horizontal self-coordination between different national CIMIC units. Coordination of the humanitarian efforts in PSOs is also inadequate. Organizations have been established in an effort to mend this, such as the IASC mentioned before. The IASC reference paper on the civil-military relationship states that “Coordination amongst humanitarian actors, preferably leading to a common approach to civil-military relations in a given complex emergency, is... desirable” (2004:7).

On the higher levels there seem to have been more reluctance and problems. The NGOs were invited to weekly meetings at the CCC where ACTED did join, but otherwise there was little contact on that level.<sup>125</sup> The humanitarian informant supports this:

“I did not wish to be seen with the military in a public setting, and we held a general distance from the military. We had some meetings on the Norwegian embassy, where humanitarian organizations, the military and the police had meetings, sharing information, who does what, what needs to be done and so on, and briefings on security, and that was very fine. But in general we kept a polite distance. This is also a question of security, if we are perceived as a part of the military mission our security is in danger. Hence I have only met with the military either in meetings facilitated by others or in informal settings.”<sup>126</sup>

In this quote the humanitarian worker hints to the increased security concerns humanitarian workers are faced with as military actors extend their traditional roles and mandates. A fragile balance surfaces, where the cost to the security of civilians must be weighted against the actual profit made by the military actors in terms of winning the

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<sup>125</sup> Interview 6 April, 2005

<sup>126</sup> Interview 11 March, 2005

“hearts and minds” of the local population. Rana (2004:568) calls this the “narrowing down of the humanitarian environment” and continues to claim that “...the distinction between civilian agencies and military actors will increasingly cease to be relevant in the eyes of the population and authorities” (ibid:580). Johansen (2004) points to the fact that military personnel are legitimate military targets, and hence the civilian population are being dangerously exposed when military personnel are taking upon them civilian tasks such as building houses and distributing food. Whitepaper 39 (2003-2004, article 6.2.2) points to the importance of maintaining the humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality, and continues to state that too close coordination and collaboration between military and humanitarian actors might reduce the local populations perception of humanitarian neutrality. The increased security concerns of humanitarian workers are evident in this statement made by MSF:

“The violence directed against humanitarian aid workers has come in a context in which the US backed coalition has consistently sought to use humanitarian aid to build support for its military and political ambitions. MSF denounces the coalition’s attempts to co-opt humanitarian aid and use it to win “hearts and minds”. By doing so, providing aid is no longer seen as an impartial and neutral act, endangering the lives of humanitarian volunteers and jeopardizing the aid to people in need. Only recently, on May 12<sup>th</sup> 2004, MSF publicly condemned the distribution of leaflets by the coalition forces in southern Afghanistan in which the population was informed that providing information about the Taliban and al-Qaeda was necessary if they wanted the delivery of aid to continue” (Statement by MSF, 28 July 2004 quoted in Rana 2004)

This statement concerns humanitarian aid provided by the military in the American-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The fact that military actors are present in Afghanistan mandated both to secure peace and stability, and at the same time being a warring faction in an actual war presents an additional problem according to the humanitarian worker.<sup>127</sup> In this respect the military appears to have several mandates, not

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<sup>127</sup> Interview 11 March, 2005

one clear mandate. On the other hand, as one officer stresses, NGOs turn up in a conflict-area equipped with a myriad of mandates.<sup>128</sup> The humanitarian worker also emphasises that the inherent difference in mandates is the reason why they do not wish to coordinate with the military component, and continues “...we do not mean that the military should have the same mandate as us. It is essential that the military deals with what is their basic mandate, and that is to secure the peace.”<sup>129</sup> The informants from the MFA support this notion. The difference in mandates is inherent, and it might provide different answers to the same question

As the dividing lines between the humanitarian and military “spaces” are becoming increasingly blurred, areas of contention and problems are surfacing leading to public debates, research and the development of guidelines in an attempt to sort out the relationship between humanitarians and the military. The ICRC adopted the “Guidelines for Civil-Military Relations” in 2001. According to Rana (2004:567, footnote 3) the term “Civil-Military Relations” was consciously chosen in order to differentiate between the ICRC’s term and the military terms of CIMIC, CMO and CA. Rana (2004:576, footnote 20) describes an invidious encounter between the ICRC and the ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) deployed in the Afghan town of Kunduz. The PRT forces chose to support a hospital that had been part of the ongoing medical programmes of ICRC. The ICRC chose to withdraw in order to avoid duplication of efforts and reduce the risk of humanitarians being confused with military forces in the eyes of native civilians. With the next rotation of ISAF forces it was decided that the programme no longer fitted with ISAF objectives and finances, and consequently the ICRC had to resume its support to the hospital.

Whitepaper 39 article 6.2.2 states that “When military personnel in exceptional cases execute tasks of a civilian nature it is important that these activities are distinctly

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<sup>128</sup> Interview 5 August, 2005

<sup>129</sup> Interview 11 March, 2005



divergent from the activity of civilian organizations.” Rana (2004:574) points to the fact that the *modus operandi* of humanitarian actors and CIMIC are almost identical in implementation when it comes to needs assessments, definition of projects, securing of financing, finding implementing partners or contractors and evaluating the impacts of their projects. One CIMIC-officer labelled it “international tourism,”<sup>130</sup> when a multiple of actors enter a theatre and map and map in the same manner. Sufficient coordination-mechanisms would be desirable, but here the explained unwillingness of humanitarian actors plays in. Evidently a system of economic mapping would require the ability to act on the assessment pretty fast, and here the military has an advantage, according to the officer.

### **6.1.3.3 Support to the force**

The core function of support to the force acknowledges that CIMIC plays a major role in achieving civilian support from within the operational theatre. AJP-9 article 104-c states that the force may be partially dependent on civilian information and resources, and that commanders will seek as much tacit support as possible.

This core function is conspicuously similar to a basic military priority, namely force protection. In both interviews and literature “support to the force” and “force protection” have been employed to describe the same function. I believe there is a certain difference between the two concepts. Traditional, physical force protection may be understood as protection of the forces by means of fire arms and armoured protection, and keeping a distance to local actors on the ground. Americans have been criticized for putting too much priority on physical force protection, and hence jeopardizing their ability to obtain consent from local authorities and populations (Nissen 2002:11). Support to the force, on the other hand, seems to imply opposite measures. By being present on the ground,

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<sup>130</sup> Interview 23 August, 2005

having constant interaction with both authorities and ordinary locals, assessing needs and perhaps launching projects based on the needs-assessments, support to the force will be obtained as a measure of good-will. This reflects on the “winning hearts and minds” thinking. Mæland also discuss the notion of betting your security on relations with the local population. His conclusion is that “Relations have a potential for power. *Relations are power*” (Mæland 2004:212, his emphasis).

Operating in the French area of responsibility, the Norwegian CIMIC teams were intended to support the French in the first instance and then ISAF. This was not easily accomplished, as elaborated on by a CIMIC officer who also touches on inherent problems with “force-protection” measures:

“We worked a lot on our own. In other areas the CIMIC units were more integrated into the force. Ideally we should have been integrated into the French contingent, and worked more directly for them, not on the outside. Then we would be able to support the force in a better manner at the same time as they could provide security for us in cases where it might be called upon. Occasionally we wished for a stronger attachment, also believing that it would be more secure for us if we had back-up. Yet we did get support in special situations, and we could certainly not drive around with armoured vehicles in front and behind us for protection at all times, that would send out completely wrong signals.”<sup>131</sup>

One CIMIC officer stated that his CIMIC team spent 50 % of their time on liaison and 50 % on support to the civil environment. Accordingly they did not attain support to the force. The fact that the Norwegian CIMIC teams did not live with the French was an impediment according to the officer, as social relations is of the essence to be able to cooperate. He continued “We were meant to support the French and ISAF, but we supported ISAF in lack of relations with the French. On the other hand, did we primarily

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<sup>131</sup> Interview 6 April, 2005

support ISAF or were we busy spending MFA money?”<sup>132</sup> The officer questions what also others in my interview-selection have questioned: the “support to the force-effect” by doing projects. Undoubtedly it is useful to the district villages to get new schools, but to the military mission this is not the issues. The issue is whether the CIMIC financing of new schools obtains support to the force and in this respect is vital to the security and operational efforts of ISAF. Several interviewees question this effect. And certainly it is not likely that local authorities and populations provide information in order to support the force, except for people extremely pleased of its presence. They are rather interested in potential projects to relieve their villages. This indicates the intertwined relationship between the core functions, where support to the force rather becomes a function of the successful accomplishment of the other two core functions. The superior aim to keep in mind though, is that CIMIC activities is, according to the doctrine, supposed to be “in support of the mission”, not in support of the civilian environment. Support to the civilian environment should be limited to the degree that it supports the military mission.

The humanitarian worker has a slightly other angle of incidence, when asking rhetorically “Can they secure security in the operational area? Or are they using most of the time to secure their own security?”<sup>133</sup> As we have seen the accomplishment of the support to the force function must be questioned. Yet the questions posed do not necessarily conflict in the manner perceived. The ISAF mandate commits ISAF to provide a safe and secure environment. CIMIC is a force commander’s tool to execute a series of functions in support of the mission, one of these functions being support to the force. The more secure international military forces are within their operational theatre, the more easily they may commit to the mandate.

#### **6.1.3.4 Observance of NATO CIMIC doctrine**

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<sup>132</sup> Interview 13 May, 2005

<sup>133</sup> Interview 11 March, 2005

The project-oriented approach to CIMIC in Afghanistan is not in accordance with NATO CIMIC doctrine. The low presence of NGOs in the Norwegian districts offers a possible explanation of the project-oriented CIMIC approach. Perhaps it was natural to the Norwegian CIMIC teams to take upon them projects in the absence of humanitarian organizations? One CIMIC-officer declined this:

“Well, it is not natural. CIMIC is not project work, our job is to establish and maintain contact, liaison, to map the situation, and point out that certain needs might be present in certain areas. And then, ideally, other organizations are meant to go in and do the projects.”<sup>134</sup>

Another officer stressed that to be able to gain information about the humanitarian situation may be very hard if the local population does not believe that they will receive something back in terms of projects.<sup>135</sup> The low presence of humanitarian actors in the Norwegian districts may have distorted the ideal division of labour and moved the CIMIC activities further into the “project-window.” The main reason for the discrepancy between doctrine and practice seem to be the fact that CJ9 was lead by Finland, who are not a NATO-member and hence not obliged to follow AJP-9. The CIMIC-officer declining project-orientation as a natural consequence of the circumstances continued to state that:

“The reason why we did what we did in Afghanistan, I will claim, is that it was a well-established procedure upon our arrival. And my claim is also that such project-oriented CIMIC is very much a Finnish legacy, as CIMIC was run by them from the beginning, and their CIMIC policy is very project-oriented. In my opinion, this is not CIMIC.”<sup>136</sup>

A path had been drawn in advance of the arrival of Norwegian CIMIC teams, influenced by the Finnish leadership. The Norwegian teams followed this path, together with the other elements under the J9 and CCC structure. According to one officer CIMIC was

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<sup>134</sup> Interview 6 April, 2005

<sup>135</sup> Interview 9 May, 2005

<sup>136</sup> Interview 6 April, 2005

“...not related to the military mission in Afghanistan. It was advantageous to the local population but lacking military gains.”<sup>137</sup>

Another potential reason for the project-orientation of CIMIC in Afghanistan has to do with financing. According to one officer, by being granted 5 million NOK, the Norwegian CIMIC teams would perhaps feel committed to do activities not within the CIMIC doctrine.<sup>138</sup> Another suggestion is that project-oriented CIMIC is partly an American legacy. The NATO CIMIC doctrine may be perceived as a European-edition doctrine, which is put under increasing pressure from the Americans. One MFA official states that the NATO doctrine in itself is conservative and easy for humanitarian actors to accept.

Germany, England and Italy, which were disconnected from the ISAF structure, differed slightly in their approaches. As already noted, the Germans were bound by a national agenda. One CIMIC-officer noted about the British:

“The British are quite close to NATO CIMIC, but they have developed their own doctrine, and perhaps they use CIMIC more consciously to support their national agenda. They were in fact closer to NATO CIMIC than the rest of us in Afghanistan, in that their CIMIC units were much more integrated into their force.”<sup>139</sup>

His statement points to another source of discrepancy between doctrine and practice. NATO CIMIC doctrine does not prescribe CIMIC to be a “sideline” activity. There seem to be inherent dangers in the potential “sideline” character of CIMIC activities. One CIMIC-officer warns against the incremental development of CIMIC into a “half-military NGO,”<sup>140</sup> by way of the temptation of domestic political authorities to provide “guidelines” on CIMIC activities not in conjuncture with NATO CIMIC doctrine. This

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<sup>137</sup> Interview 23 August, 2005

<sup>138</sup> Interview 13 May, 2005

<sup>139</sup> Interview 6 April, 2005

<sup>140</sup> Interview 13 May, 2005

reflects on the project-orientation once again. One officer observes optimistically in light of recent developments in Iraq and Afghanistan “Now we see that CIMIC increasingly is treated as part of the operation, during all phases, and not something which is being kept on the sideline.”<sup>141</sup> Another officer compares CIMIC in Afghanistan with CIMIC in Kosovo, claiming that in Kosovo CIMIC was integrated into the operation, in a manner where “everybody did CIMIC work”, whereas in Afghanistan CIMIC was more on the sideline.<sup>142</sup>

One CIMIC-officer highlighted the difficulties of adopting the doctrine entirely, due to different national economic presuppositions. In isolation the best thing would be if all means could be channelled to NATO and then out to the operational theatres, but this is hardly attainable suggested the officer, as it would be hard for political authorities to grant money if forces from other countries were to spend them.<sup>143</sup>

One CIMIC officer stressed the possibility for interpretations within the given frameworks.<sup>144</sup> Frantzen (2005:4) writes that military doctrines “...will seldom be specific and detailed but rather broad and general to allow for improvisation and adaptation in accordance with the special circumstances of each conflict.” This is certainly true, but seemingly Norwegian CIMIC in Afghanistan operated partly outside the AJP-9 framework without this being due to special circumstances in the operational theatre. Nissen (2002:24-25) emphasizes the need for a focus beyond doctrine. According to him decisions made on the ground do not necessarily reflect doctrine, and further on he claims that doctrinal development with regards to PSO traditionally has lagged behind the development of organizational behaviour. His notions seem to be validated in this case, and perhaps the conceptual confusion surrounding CIMIC combined with further experiences and pressures will lead to doctrinal adaptation to the operational realities. The

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<sup>141</sup> Interview 6 April, 2005

<sup>142</sup> Interview 23 August, 2005

<sup>143</sup> Interview 9 May, 2005

<sup>144</sup> Interview 6 April, 2005

interesting fact yet to notice is that the Norwegian CIMIC officers embrace the NATO CIMIC doctrine, some expressing that the discrepancies they experienced between doctrine and practice in fact made parts of their activities “not CIMIC.”<sup>145</sup>

## **6.2 The impact of culturalism and social learning**

The culturalist hypothesis seeking to explain the Norwegian approach to CIMIC suggests that: *H 4: The Norwegian approach to civil-military cooperation in Afghanistan was a product of the Norwegian political and military organizational culture and the impact of social learning.*

### **6.2.1 The Norwegian approach to CIMIC in Afghanistan as a product of political culture and military organizational culture**

When it comes to the Norwegian approach to CIMIC in Afghanistan, the causal impact of political culture must be questioned. In this case Kier’s model might be too one-sided, putting too much emphasis on political culture for it to be relevant for small states. It is likely that social learning has an interfering impact on the Norwegian approach to CIMIC in Afghanistan. In this section I will discuss how the political and military culture may influence the Norwegian approach to CIMIC. This will be done partly in a comparative light, where the different “flavours” of national contingents will be highlighted.

I focused on two indicators when elaborating on the Norwegian political culture, namely the territorial bond of the historical defence traditions and the Norwegian peace tradition. The historical defence-traditions supposedly had an impact on the Norwegian approach to CIMIC in the legacy of an egalitarian military structure. Ulriksen (2002:145) hints to this point, where the ability to make decisions on a low tactical level probably is well suited for Norwegian soldiers, and more so perhaps than soldiers from more rigid, hierarchical

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<sup>145</sup> Interview April 6, 2005

cultures. To the Norwegian CIMIC teams working detached from the French contingent, this legacy could prove to be an advantage.

When it comes to the peace tradition the Norwegian CIMIC officers may be perceived as carriers of that tradition, to the degree they have internalized its discourse. One consequence of the Norwegian peace tradition might be that local authorities and populations perceive the Norwegian CIMIC officers as coming from a “humanitarian peace nation,” to quote the Norwegian self-image. An opinion poll made in Europe in connection with the celebration of Norway’s 100 years of independence from Sweden shows that the Norwegian self-image is not reflected in other European countries’ associations of Norway.<sup>146</sup> “Magnificent nature” scores 44 %, whilst “friendliness and openness” and “national wealth” succeeds with 8 %. The association “a nation with focus on humanitarian activity/operations” is made by 0 %. This poll was made in Europe, but it suggests that the common Afghan might not associate Norway with humanitarianism.

Yet being carriers of the peace tradition with its focus on democracy and human rights is a decided advantage, as stressed by the humanitarian worker: “Norwegian CIMIC has many advantages, first and foremost because they come with a democratic awareness of people’s rights, and respect for human rights. This is a fundamental human rights perception I do not think you can find in so many other places.”<sup>147</sup>

Motivations for participating in PSOs have proved to be mixed, perhaps with less focus on idealistic motives than anticipated. One of the CIMIC-officers I interviewed stated the following: “I suppose I have a spirit for adventure. I think it is very rewarding to be out with the armed forces, and I thought that perhaps this would be even more rewarding, as it involved more contact with the civilian population.”<sup>148</sup> Many of the CIMIC-officers have

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<sup>146</sup> “Norge er ingen humanitær stormakt” (read 20 September, 2005):  
<http://www.hundrearsmarkeringen.no/presse/meldinger/pmdebatt1.htm>

<sup>147</sup> Interview 11 March, 2005

<sup>148</sup> Interview 9 May, 2005



a civilian education, and a mixed civilian and military background. The humanitarian worker sees the combination of human-, work-, and international experience as a decided advantage. Civilian competencies are advantageous in CIMIC work. “CIMIC recruits personnel whom are often idealistic in mentality or spirit”<sup>149</sup> according to one officer. Maybe CIMIC personnel differ in motivation from recruits to other missions, in that idealism is an assertive factor. Still some officers also focused on CIMIC as a “niche-capacity,” from which they could gain narrow and desired competencies. Yet, cultural awareness and a desire to be involved with the local population make for a good point of departure in executing CIMIC tasks.

Mæland (ibid:49-50) illustrates how the focus on “doing a good job” combined with a preoccupation with the near, that being with the troops, overshadowed the distant strategy when deployed abroad. Distant strategy did not carry sufficient meaning to his interviewees, in their desire to do something meaningful when deployed abroad. Subsequently “To speak of Norwegian politicians or the international community’s intents appear irrefutably as a bit odd when patrolling on a dusty main road in Obilic or Kosovo Polje” (ibid). The CIMIC-officers in my interview material did not focus on strategic concerns when elaborating on the success of their mission. They seem to differ in the choice of indicators measuring success. One officer stated that:

“The CIMIC mission was very successful. It was very narrow, too narrow, and needs to be further developed. But we spent our money, and I disagree that it is wrong for men in green to use assistance means for humanitarian purposes. It is important for the military to support the civil society.”<sup>150</sup>

Another officer stated that “I am uncertain whether it contributed to winning the hearts and minds of the Afghans. We did a lot of good work, and what we did we did very well,

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<sup>149</sup> Interview 1 June, 2005

<sup>150</sup> Interview 1 June, 2005

but we did not do the right things. This was not CIMIC.”<sup>151</sup> A third officer seem to agree in stating that “Successful, yes, when we received money, but it was far out in the project-window, and it is dangerous to do that too often, as it sends a signal to politicians about a “feel-good” thing, where the military focus is lost.”<sup>152</sup> This officer hints to the political-strategic level, but warns against the temptation to use CIMIC as a foreign policy tool to such a degree that the military mission is being jeopardized. Success in terms of accomplishing strategic goals does not seem to be of the essence to the CIMIC officers. The feeling of success in accomplishment will arguably carry with it the feeling of having done something meaningful. Different focus and perceptions as to what CIMIC should entail might have created variations in the degree of meaning obtained and understandings of success. Yet CIMIC is perceived as a meaningful service, which is also emphasised in an article published on Forsvarsnett just after the return of CIMIC element one. The article was labelled “A meaningful service in Afghanistan” (Homo 2003), where an interviewed CIMIC-officer stressed the meaningfulness of the operation and the good feeling of accomplishment upon return.

We have already seen how the Norwegian CIMIC teams were focused on relation-building. Relation-building towards the local population and authorities are intrinsically linked to consent.

When it comes to the use of force CIMIC as a combat service support function did not often encounter situations where the use of force proved necessary. The most serious episode happened on 13 May, 2003, when two Norwegian CIMIC officers were shot at whilst guarding a house holding a meeting in a village in the district Mir Bacha Kot. One of the officers barely survived. A newspaper correspondent (Andreassen 2004) have investigated the episode and points to deficient security routines. According to the correspondent the area in which the Norwegian CIMIC teams operated had not been

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<sup>151</sup> Interview 6 April, 2005

<sup>152</sup> Interview 13 May, 2005

subject to security and intelligence deliberations, the Norwegian CIMIC officers felt safe in an area which proved to have a Taliban presence, the cooperation between the Norwegian CIMIC teams and the French who was suppose to provide protection did not work very well, and the two officers felt so secure that they chose not to wear their body armour. The episode shows that it may have been hard to assess the threat-situation in the areas where small and relatively unprotected Norwegian CIMIC teams operated. CIMIC training in Norway prior to deployment to Afghanistan was changed after the episode, with more focus on securing of one's own (Skjæret 2003). In the operational theatre on the other hand, one CIMIC-officer claimed that:

“I believe that the security regulations for Norwegian CIMIC were the same before and after the incident, even though our reading and execution of these became more pointedly. The incident came as a bit of a surprise. But, we went through and demanded threat-assessments on our area. A National Intelligence unit was seconded to the Norwegian commando in Operation Enduring Freedom, but this national resource was not prioritized for Norwegian CIMIC in ISAF. The shots and wounds on the 13th of May did not echo into any political or operational consequence at the national level.”<sup>153</sup>

Another CIMIC-officer on the other hand stated that “I believe we had a much higher level of security than the first element, and as far as I understood the third element had a higher level than us again.”<sup>154</sup> Thomassen (2003) claimed that the security regulations for French CIMIC teams were made more stringent after the incident, whilst the Norwegian teams operated as they had done before the episode. According to the article the French CIMIC teams were now protected by trained personnel and armoured vehicles when travelling in the field, whilst the Norwegian teams doing just about the same job had to do without that kind of protection. According to the embassy diplomat “The gunman was a previous Taliban, now dismissed; he claimed he heard a voice in his head, he did not

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<sup>153</sup> Interview 1 June, 2005

<sup>154</sup> Interview 9 May, 2005

shoot because the military was building a school...”<sup>155</sup> The focus on relation-building and consent rather than force protection measures seem to be a feature of this episode.

According to the officers there were differences between the camps in regard to security regulations. Differences would occur if one camp tightened up, and later another. Single episodes such as the one mentioned above, as well as operations in tense areas could lead to adjustments. National contingents were also free to make the ISAF regulations more stringent. According to one officer “It could be different policies on this. We followed the ISAF regulations. The other CIMIC units also did that. So, faced by the same threat picture, we would act alike.”<sup>156</sup>

According to one interviewee in the NUPI database on KFOR:

“There are different flavours to how the brigades do things...This is a result of their military tradition, their history and their training. So, based on this, the nations will go after or back down from trouble... So, it is possible to change the flavour. But if you want to do that, you should not lecture the other, but allow them to do their things next to you and let them watch you do things...So what we want is to watch what others do, and take the best from them.”

The different flavours were also apparent in the CIMIC work in Afghanistan. One CIMIC officer points to the differences between the Norwegian and German approaches: “The Norwegian approach is informal, works hard to develop relations, perceived by others as not very military in its substance. The Germans are formalistic, bureaucratic, and rigid, that is they have a different military culture.”<sup>157</sup> He continues to state that the Norwegian approach was more similar to that of the Nordic countries, and next to that of the West-European countries. The Americans operated with other proportions, and lacked analysis of local conditions. The disadvantage of different flavours is stressed by an officer:

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<sup>155</sup> Interview 16 June, 2005

<sup>156</sup> Interview 6 April, 2005

<sup>157</sup> Interview 1 June, 2005

“There are no advantages at all, when you are joining an operation, as long as it is not national, you have a chief, and if the way of solving the mission is divergent, then it won’t succeed.”<sup>158</sup> The military-cultural equalities with the British were emphasised by some of the officers. Mæland (2004:56) also points to this, stating that the British are considered as very professional, calm and determined, and that the Norwegians are feeling related to the British perhaps due to cultural concurrence.

The role perception as “humanitarian military” should arguably be easily applicable to CIMIC, due to the nature of the mission. We have previously seen that the humanitarian actors very much dislike the mixture of humanitarian and military “spaces”. One CIMIC-officer stresses that this blurring of lines is not appreciated by the military component either.<sup>159</sup> This implies a wish for clear dividing lines, roles and mandates on both parts. Bi-SC 86-3 (article 6c) states that “CIMIC implies neither military control of civilian organisations or agencies nor the reverse.” A confusing label as “humanitarian military” may not necessarily be desirable. Mæland intends to build a bridge between “humanitarian” and “military” in order to create a professional self-image and identity absorbing the search for meaning. Whether the two role-perceptions are compatible in their characteristics is highly questionable, and I do not believe it to be the case. Neither do I believe it to be desirable, as the two, despite increased blurring, are performing different tasks in accordance with different mandates. This is not to say that military personnel may not be humanitarian, only that the label “humanitarian” ought to be reserved for humanitarian actors working in the humanitarian space.

Seemingly the Norwegian political culture and military organizational culture produces a certain approach to CIMIC. This approach is in line with the “liberal approach” to CIMIC, where available funding from humanitarian budgets allows for humanitarian activism, and the focus on physical force protection measures are downscaled.

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<sup>158</sup> Interview 6 April, 2005

<sup>159</sup> Interview 13 May, 2005

### 6.2.2 The intervening impact of social learning

Social learning is measured by discussing previous experiences with CIMIC, attendance to international training courses and social interaction with other contingencies during deployment.

All the CIMIC-officers I interviewed had at least participated in one peace support operation prior to Afghanistan, and they also had experience from CIMIC-work, though perhaps with other labels but arguably performing similar functions. The officers agreed that Norwegian CIMIC had “learned” from previous experiences in PSOs and international military operations, but as one officer stressed “... it was first as we arrived in Afghanistan that we have been doing CIMIC on a greater scale.”<sup>160</sup> All the CIMIC officers had also attended, and some even served as instructors on, CIMIC courses abroad. One CIMIC officer stated that CIMIC-courses are highly prioritized.<sup>161</sup> Courses are arranged by HQ CGN in the Dutch city of Budel, with participants from several nations, in addition to NORCAPS<sup>162</sup> courses and courses arranged by the Finnish due to their command of ISAF J9. CIMIC element three participated on the field practice Nordic Peace in Finland before deployment to Afghanistan. Hence they had practical experience in addition to courses in the Netherlands and Denmark.

Apparently the Norwegian CIMIC personnel serving in Afghanistan had more CIMIC experience and training than the Norwegian officers performing CIMIC tasks in Kosovo. In section 4.6 I described how Nissen (2002:73) emphasised the inadequate training and lack of extensive CIMIC experience with Norwegian officers serving in Kosovo. The reasons are probably the Norwegian participation in CGN and the consequent

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<sup>160</sup> Interview 6 April, 2005

<sup>161</sup> Interview 1 June, 2005

<sup>162</sup> Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support

establishment of the readiness-list, where devoted and experienced personnel could apply, and the doctrinal development within NATO attempting to sort out the conceptual confusion. CIMIC is in a process of development, which the Norwegian CIMIC-deployment to Afghanistan has taken one step further.

“We learn from everybody else” stated on CIMIC-officer, and continued “we have an idea that we are ourselves pretty good at CIMIC, and learn from both our own mistakes and the mistakes of others. We have a large circle of acquaintances; we see where it fails, we are our own masters of teaching, but learn from others mistakes.”<sup>163</sup> The military-cultural legacy from the British has been mentioned before. The officer suggests that with CIMIC the British are perhaps more influenced by the Norwegians than the other way around.

The importance of socialisation is emphasised by one CIMIC-officer stating that “Socialisation with other nations is intrinsic to CIMIC.”<sup>164</sup> The relationship with the French contingent seems to be an exception. This may be due to differences in language and military culture. According to Leerand (2003) the Norwegians arranged an open house for Norwegians and colleagues from other nations every Thursday in Camp Fredheim. This was considered a valuable arena for exchanging news and played an important social function according to the Colonel Lieutenant Joar Fjellstad.

Due to the substantial participation on courses and field-exercises abroad, and previous experiences from CIMIC related activities, I think it is reasonable to suggest that the CIMIC-officers have been subject to “social learning,” which again influences their military organizational culture. The relational aspects with the concept of CIMIC stimulates “social learning,” and adds credit to the suggestion that the CIMIC-officers have been influenced throughout their experiences, training, coursing and social relations.

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<sup>163</sup> Interview 1 June, 2005

<sup>164</sup> Interview 23 August, 2005

## **Part 5 Conclusion**

# **7. Conclusion**

## ***7.1 Introduction***

“Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it” claimed Dag Hammerskjöld, the former UN Secretary General (1953) as the UN was embarking on its first generation of peacekeeping. Today peacekeeping has become an integral part of the military profession. The realization has moved closer to the statement given by Lieutenant Colonel P. E. Korström, that “Peacekeeping is a job for soldiers, but soldiers alone can not do it.” The conceptions of peacekeeping and civil-military cooperation have changed fundamentally since the end of the Cold War, and a consolidation is not likely to occur in the foreseeable future. Within the different nation militaries diverse interpretations of CIMIC exists. CIMIC contributes to the enhancement of mutual understandings between military and civilian components, and are an essential tool faced with a third and possibly a fourth generation of peacekeeping. In this thesis I have sought to explain the Norwegian decision to contribute with a CIMIC unit to Afghanistan, and the consequent approach of Norwegian CIMIC to the mission. I developed four hypotheses set up in a competitive design, two for each part of the research question. The purpose of the thesis has been both theoretical and empirical. Theoretically I intended to investigate how two substantive theories based on a supposedly incompatible meta-theoretical foundation would be able to explain a case from the military domain. Empirically the purpose was to investigate CIMIC as a concept and study which indicators explain on the decision to contribute with a CIMIC unit, and the consequent approach to the mission.



## **7.2 The main findings of the analysis**

### **7.2.1 Empirical findings**

In the introduction chapter I forwarded the following research question:

*"What explains the Norwegian decision to contribute with a civil-military cooperation unit to the peace support operation in Afghanistan, and consequently what explains the Norwegian approach to civil-military cooperation in Afghanistan?"*

When analyzing the first part of the research question I established that identified Norwegian security-policy interests and military strategic objectives played an important part in the decision to contribute with a CIMIC unit. The security-policy interests of securing continued NATO relevance and developing a relevant niche-capacity were significant to the decision to contribute with a CIMIC unit. Despite the fact that these interests were not to a great degree emphasised by the interviewees they are clearly stated in official documents. The military strategic goals of continued participation in CGN, cost-effectiveness and testing CIMIC as a concept were stressed by several informants. Gaining experience and developing a Norwegian CIMIC policy was not emphasised in the same manner. Yet acquiring valuable experience and expertise is a stated aim for Norwegian participation in international military operations, and the development of a Norwegian CIMIC-policy will probably be spurred by the CIMIC experience in Afghanistan notwithstanding a conscious or stated intention of such a development. The culturalist hypothesis suggested that the decision to contribute with a CIMIC unit to Afghanistan was a Norwegian interest defined by Norwegian political and military organizational culture. The analysis shows that the Norwegian humanitarian and peace-tradition vocabulary and self-image fit the CIMIC contribution well. CIMIC also seem to be in line with what might turn out to be a new defence-tradition, where international

deployment is incorporated into military professionalism but, as of yet, preferably with a soft, peacekeeping mandate.

When analysing how national security-interests were apparent in the Norwegian approach to CIMIC in Afghanistan, I focused on visibility and doctrinal observance. CIMIC was a visible contribution, particularly by the means of projects and the consequent “flagging” of these projects. The visibility-effect was increased by national financing, making it possible to concentrate the efforts in the Norwegian area of responsibility. The Norwegian CIMIC elements were engaged in all three CIMIC core activities, namely civil-military liaison, support to the civil environment and support to the force. Yet the support to the civil environment function seems to have been in focus, perhaps at the expense of the other core activities. The project-oriented approach embraced to fulfil this function was not perceived to be in line with NATO CIMIC doctrine. The degree to which the CIMIC elements operated on the “sideline” of the French contingency in Afghanistan was also perceived as a decided disadvantage. One MFA informant suggests that “CIMIC should be integrated into the force rather than a unit of 20 men. This was an experiment, and it was not successful, not optimal.”<sup>165</sup> The MoD official would not perceive CIMIC in Afghanistan as an experiment, but adds that in the case of a new CIMIC deployment it would be suitable to attach it to a greater Norwegian contribution.<sup>166</sup> The Aftenposten correspondent Andreassen writes in an article about the shooting-episode in May 2003 that:

“They [the CIMIC officers interviewed] would rather see Norway contributing with a greater number of soldiers at the same time so that they to a certain degree can look after themselves, and gain a certain weight in respect to the contingencies of other countries. – Operating with small units in a limited period of time will mainly be simple “flagging”, says one officer. – It is too cheap and lacks continuity. Traditionally Norway has contributed with a relatively great

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<sup>165</sup> Interview 3 June, 2005

<sup>166</sup> Interview 20 May, 2005

contingency over a longer period of time. It is about time that we do the same thing in Afghanistan...” (Andreassen 2004, my translation)

Sølvberg (2004) also emphasises the previous tendency of contributing with larger and more static force-contributions to e.g. Lebanon and the Balkans, whilst the efforts in Afghanistan has been characterized by a greater span in the contributions, where one force-contribution is deployed for a shorter period of time to be replaced by other contributions. In conclusion the visibility of CIMIC in terms of promoting Norwegian security-policy interests seems to have been achieved. On the other hand, the Norwegian approach to CIMIC to a certain degree does not seem to have been “militarily rational” in terms of doctrinal observance. The doctrinal deviations lead some CIMIC-officers to perceive of the mission as “not-CIMIC”. Perhaps different conclusions must be drawn depending on where you stand. From a political point of view the Norwegian approach to the CIMIC mission was successful. From a military point of view the following question must be posed: Did the Norwegian CIMIC teams support the military mission? Some of my CIMIC informants found this to be the case. Others perceived CIMIC as it had emerged in Afghanistan as too far out in the “project window”, with the subsequent danger of “mission creep.”<sup>167</sup>

The culturalist hypothesis suggested that the Norwegian approach to CIMIC in Afghanistan was a product of the Norwegian political and military organizational cultures and the impact of social learning. The analysis shows that the Norwegian political and military organizational cultures produce a certain approach to CIMIC, in line with a “liberal approach” to CIMIC.

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<sup>167</sup> Daniel and Hayes (in Pugh 1997:9) define mission creep as: “Mission creep occurs when there is an incremental increase in the tasks assigned UN forces to the point that the tasks far exceed initial expectations of what the forces had planned for and were equipped to achieve”

### 7.2.2 Theoretical findings

Fearon and Wendt (in Carlsnaes et al. 2002:52) ask the question whether progress in IR is best served by perceiving the field as a battle of analytical paradigms. They claim that despite the existence of substantial differences, the meta-theoretical foundations also share substantial similarities. Further on they claim that "...where genuine differences exists they are as often complementarities as contradictions" (ibid.). Jepperson et al. (in Katzenstein (ed.) 1996) seem to agree in arguing that "The discussion of the various possible relationships between differing lines of argument seems impaired by the highly reified "paradigm-talk"..." Fearon and Wendt (in Carlsnaes et al. 2002:53) argue that rationalism and constructivism are most fruitfully viewed as "...analytical tools or lenses with which to theorize about world politics." Pragmatically treating rationalism and constructivism as analytical tools does not oblige the researcher to make ontological or empirical commitments (ibid).

I set up a competitive theoretical design for this thesis, in order to test the theories against each other as well as against the evidence. I argued that my case was a "hard case", well-suited to test a cultural theory. As previously seen Desch argues that what constitutes a "hard case" is not issue-area, but whether the competing theories make different predictions about its outcome. The first part of my research question was perhaps not a "critical case" in this respect, as both the rationalist and the culturalist hypotheses support the decision to contribute with a CIMIC unit to Afghanistan. Hence, none of the theories supplant the other; they are more likely to supplement each other, each explaining one part of the puzzle. Arguably, though, it seems that culturalism has less causal impact than rationalism in the first part of the research question. The rationalist variables are more compelling. When it comes to the second part of the research question the two theories may predict different approaches. The culturalist theory would predict a "liberal approach" to CIMIC, in line with indicators of the Norwegian political culture and military organizational culture. The rationalist theory would rather predict a flexible

approach, were support to the military mission gained more attention and projects less. At the same time the “flexible approach” would allow for a “militarily rational” approach in terms of execution of the core CIMIC functions. When analyzing this part of the research question it appeared that rational, political-strategic goals were accomplished by the Norwegian approach to CIMIC, but this was not necessarily in compliance a rational military approach. Accordingly, the political-strategic part of the rationalist hypothesis would also predict a “liberal approach” to CIMIC. Again it is reasonable to suggest that the rational variables have more explanatory power than the culturalist variables. But the relationship between the theories may not be characterized it not necessarily competitive, to use the label of Jupille et al. (2002: 14). Rather it would seem that the relationship between the rationalist and the culturalist theories have been additive or sequential, where “...the whole presents some gains over partial representations, all while preserving the integrity of the contributions of the parts” (ibid).

### ***7.3 Possible future prospects for CIMIC***

In this section I will first briefly present a desired future execution of CIMIC as proposed by a CIMIC officer. Then I will present three potential future prospects, which are not mutually exclusive, but all hinting to possible developments linked to present trends. These prospects are tied to the future of foreign aid, privatization of security and the concept of integrated missions.

The CIMIC officer lists three objectives he considers intrinsic to the future execution of CIMIC.<sup>168</sup> Firstly, CIMIC must be integrated from the planning-phase of an operation. Evidently, CIMIC as a “sideline” activity is not perceived as the best way to support the military mission. Additionally it is vital to include CIMIC from the early planning-phases, in order to gain military efficiency and possibly facilitate reaching the end-state faster.

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<sup>168</sup> Interview 6 April, 2005

Secondly, financial resources must be at the disposal of the force commander. Rollins (2001: 127-128) agrees with this line of thinking, claiming that “NATO has mechanisms to fund CIMIC activities at theatre level. If more national funds could be channelled through these mechanisms, rather than through national military contributions, theatre-level coordination might become easier.” Yet there are obstacles to this accomplishment as discussed in my analysis. One obstacle carrying a heavy load is the fact that states may be unwilling to sponsor the CIMIC activities of other national contingencies, which consequently earn the possible “good-will effect” of CIMIC activities. By gaining a broader vision and perspective the realization may win through that CIMIC should be executed in support of the mission, not in support of a particular contingency and hence funding at the disposal of the force commander may be the best way to avoid distortions within the area of operations and spread the resources in a best possible manner. The third objective is related to the second, namely that CIMIC must not support national agendas. I will not claim that this is an accomplishable objective, but developments may reduce the impact of national agendas. Doctrinal observance may lead to greater transparency and coordination. A gradual definitional agreement on CIMIC and consequently more similar approaches might decrease the impact of national agendas. Yet, the Armed Forces are a foreign policy instrument, and to isolate a force contribution from the greater political and national agenda is inconceivable.

### **7.3.1 The future of foreign aid**

Todd Sandler (1998) has written an article on global and regional public goods, in which he makes some comments on the future of foreign aid possibly relevant to CIMIC. Sandler claims that the income gap between the very richest nations and the very poorest nations will increase. This gap underlies Sandler's prediction about the future of foreign aid. As the world is faced with pending environmental, health and security challenges, the very richest nations will be the nations to avoid future environmental disasters, to cure

diseases, to monitor the planet and to disarm rogue nations. Sandler (ibid:236) suggests that the efforts made by the richest nations to prevent instability in places such as Bosnia and Kuwait to spread is an example of how the public good of stability maintenance is being provided by the richest nations. In regime theory, the “public good” problem represent an enforcement problem as illustrated with the “prisoners’ dilemma”. The “public good” problem is when actors can not be excluded from the consumption of a good, and consequently tends to “free-ride” so the good is undersupplied (Fehl 2004:363). Sandler suggests that in the future, traditional forms of foreign aid may be replaced by the rich countries providing such public goods as stability. Hence “Tomorrow’s foreign aid” may be “free-rider aid””, that e.g. eliminates threats to world peace (ibid:223). Further on this anticipated change in foreign aid will circumvent what Sandler identifies as foreign aid fatigue with the rich countries and the reluctance of countries to give aid enriching corrupt regimes. Simultaneously the voters of rich countries will accept this free-rider foreign aid, as the voters benefit from the public goods provided. In sum the argument is that free-rider aid, in terms of provision of public goods, is apt to supersede traditional forms of giving. From a CIMIC point of view the proposal implies that CIMIC will be an incorporated part of a new foreign aid regime providing the public good of stabilization. In this respect MFA funding would be unproblematic, an extended security concept would be activated and the dividing-lines between political, humanitarian and military contributions would be increasingly blurred mixed in a superior “free rider foreign aid” perspective.

### **7.3.2 Privatization of security**

The role of business in the world of security, commonly referred to as “privatization of security”, is according to Bailes “....wide and varied, just as it has been at every stage of human history.”<sup>169</sup> Bailes identifies three generic types of interaction between business

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<sup>169</sup> “Business and security – in search of a holistic view”, speaking notes for Alyson J. K. Bailes, Director, SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), Oslo, 3 March 2005

and security, the first being “The delegation or transfer of traditional security activities by state actors to non-state ones.” She further claims that today a growing number of strong states are engaging private security companies for a variety of functions, typically to be able to focus its military capacities increasingly on rapid-reaction interventions overseas without major defence budget increase. The logic is to cut down on surplus personnel and expenses allowing military personnel to concentrate on “hard core” combat duties where they can be inserted into a situation and withdrawn again as rapidly as possible. Bailes suggests that the U.S., the U.K. and France are the best examples of this trend, whilst in the Nordic region Denmark and Finland are starting to consider some degree of privatization of support services. Subsequently she lists a number of services in the defence cycle which may subject to privatization, such as routine services that do not require special military skills, services that do not have to be provided in the front line, non-combat services in the front line, military-type services to supplement regular personnel such as guards and intelligence collection, and post-combat service. Bailes emphasised that “The privatization of “post-combat” functions is a particularly marked trend at present as countries on the one hand understand the need for lengthy reconstruction but on the other grow more wary of tying down and over-committing their forces” (ibid.). Rana also discuss this privatization-trend, claiming that “Key states, armed forces and possibly humanitarian actors will push for even greater use of civilian contractors to carry out humanitarian and reconstruction activities, thus outsourcing risks, roles and responsibilities” (2004:580). CIMIC as a combat support function must be considered placed in the target-group of security privatization. We might see a development where some states focus on CIMIC as a niche capacity, whilst other nations choose to outsource this function to be able to concentrate on other capacities. The Norwegian direction is hard to suggest, but as of today CIMIC is firmly placed and conceptually explored within the ranks of the Armed Forces.



### 7.3.3 Integrated missions

The transition from the first generation peacekeeping to the complex, multifunctional operations of the post-Cold War era spurred the development of the concept “integrated missions”. An independent UN study, “Report on Integrated Missions,” directs attention to the lack of a strategic, coordinated and sustained international effort in peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts. The report points to an improvement in performance, but adds that “...the success rate in long-term stabilisation is still too low, and many countries relapse into conflict after an initial period of stabilisation” (Eide et al. 2005: 3). The UN seeks to help countries is the transition from war to lasting peace by means of an “integrated mission” instrument. The general assumption is that integration is the way of the future, but still the concept lacks a unified definition and a number of divergent practices have emerged (ibid.). The report defines “integrated mission” as:

“...an instrument with which the UN seeks to help countries in the transition from war to lasting peace, or address a similarly complex situation that requires a system-wide UN response, through subsuming various actors and approaches within an overall political-strategic crisis management framework” (ibid: 14).

The concept of integrated missions might also be transferred to the level of national contributions to “complex situations”, and to the civil-military relationship. As previously mentioned Greve and Hertzberg (2001:21) were not able to establish a Norwegian vision, intention, policy or goal for civil-military cooperation in a PSO, in other words, the political agenda seemed to be missing. I have showed that in terms of profiling, “flagging” and visibility the Norwegian CIMIC elements have served a political purpose. Yet I have not established a political agenda when it comes to integrating Norwegian military and civil efforts in Afghanistan as a means to achieve political synergies and increased efficiency. One CIMIC officer suggests that “The MFA is dreaming of Norwegian military forces and Norwegian NGOs working together in the same area,

providing a dual Norwegian effect, but the NGOs are not very interested in such a scenario.”<sup>170</sup> Considering that both CIMIC and NGOs are being funded by the MFA and the expected synergy-effects of such integration, this is not an unwarranted suggestion. Integration may be the way of the future, but one of the largest obstacles in the way of it is scepticism on the part of the humanitarian sector. A key concern is the possible infringement of humanitarian principles such as humanity, independence and neutrality that could follow from integration (Eide et al. 2005:13-14). Rana (2004:580) makes the following remarks:

“...there is a risk that the gap between policy and practice will grow. Some humanitarian actors will, with difficulty, resist political and financial pressures to integrate into broader efforts. Others will simply accept that they are not neutral or independent, and adapt their modus operandi to the realities of the situation. Collective and constructive dialogue on the civil-military relationship might become difficult for a community of humanitarian agencies with divergent mandates.”

Rana (ibid: 578) also identifies some positive aspects to integration, e.g. civilians might promote greater cultural sensitivity, lobby for greater awareness of the effects of conflict on civilian populations and provide technical and political advice. Evidently, integration of military, political and humanitarian efforts will not see the light of day in some time to come. But still, the UN study report testifies to increased attention and acknowledgement, and perhaps integration will sneak in the backdoor by incremental steps.

## **7.4 Further research**

A number of potential studies emerge from this thesis. It could be interesting to study CIMIC approaches in a comparative light, preferably a “liberal approach” to CIMIC with flexible or conservative approaches. It could also be interesting to view the Norwegian

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<sup>170</sup> Interview 23 August, 2005

approach from an outsiders' perspective, and to study what states choosing another approach than the Norwegian thinks of the Norwegian approach. Further inquiries into the concept of CIMIC are important. A goal must be to acquire international consensus on the meaning of CIMIC to reduce misinterpretations and facilitate similar responses, and to achieve this theoretical and empirical studies will be called upon. The civil-military relations have been much studied from a humanitarian point of view, but not so much from a military point of view. The effect of support to the force measures would be an interesting study, requiring field-studies to an operational theatre to measure the actual "winning hearts and minds" effect in the affected local population. The study of possible effects of force contributions could also be interesting. Does Norway achieve access to important decision-making channels by participating in international military operations? Does it make any difference if the contribution is "soft" or "hard"? Does Norway camouflage a preference for "hard" force contributions at the end of the day? The potential CIMIC prospects also opens for some interesting topics. Research on Norwegian military organizational culture would be very interesting, asking e.g. what does it take to change a military organizational culture? It could seem that my thesis is left with many doors unopened, and I believe this to be inevitable as I have investigated a complex, comprehensive and continuously evolving concept.

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## 9. Appendix

### 9.2 Appendix 1: Interview guide


#### Norsk CIMIC generelt:

- Har du tidligere erfaring med CIMIC?
- Hvorfor bidrar Norge med CIMIC elementer til Afghanistan etter din oppfatning?
- Hvilke retningslinjer/doktriner baserer norsk CIMIC seg på?
- Hva slags trening fikk du på forhånd?

#### CIMIC i Afghanistan:

- Når var du i Afghanistan?
- Hvilke andre nasjoner bidro med CIMIC elementer i din periode?
- Hvor mye tid brukes på de forskjellige kjernefunksjonene til CIMIC?
- Hvordan kunne en "normal" dag forløpe seg?
- Hvilke prosjekter arbeidet CIMIC med når du var i Afghanistan?
- Hvordan foregikk liasoneringen med lokale myndigheter i Afghanistan? NGOer?
- Opplevde du at CIMIC enheter fra ulike nasjonale kontingenter hadde ulik tilnærming til oppdraget? Ble mandatet tolket ulikt?
- Slapp nasjonale agendaer til i CIMIC?
- Hadde ulike nasjonale CIMIC forskjellig tilnærming til force protection?
- På hvilken måte skilte den norske tilnærmingen seg eventuelt fra andre tilnærminger?
- Er den norske tilnærmingen til CIMIC mer lik noen nasjoner enn andre?
- Vektlegger noen nasjoner betydningen av CIMIC mer enn andre? Hva med Norge?
- Hva er fordelene med ulike nasjonale tilnærminger til CIMIC? Hva er ulempene?
- Har norsk tilnærming til CIMIC "lært" fra tidligere erfaringer i fredsstøttende operasjoner?
- Har norsk CIMIC "lært" fra andre nasjonale tilnærminger? Hvem er våre "læremestere"?
- Hvordan oppleves koordineringen av CIMIC?
- Hva synes du om finansieringen av CIMIC?
- Forholdt CIMIC seg til UD, FD eller begge?
- Er CIMIC "akseptert" av de mer tradisjonelle bransjene?
- Vil du beskrive CIMIC oppdraget som vellykket?

## 9.2 Appendix 2: Map



Source: <http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/graphics/e040628a.jpg>

